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Constitutional Limitations on State .... 
Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption 
Legislation and the Long 
Overdue Case for Uniformity 
by 
Lawrence Ponoroff* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past few decades have witnessed numerous attempts to supply a 
theoretical justification for the consumer bankruptcy system, ranging from 
considerations of procedural convenience (or inconvenience), to assuring pru-
dent credit decision-making, to the accomplishment of unique objectives of 
social and distributive justice. 1 Whatever the explanation, however, the un-
*Samuel M. Fegtly Chair in Commercial Law, The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of 
Law. I'd like to express my appreciation to my friend and frequent collaborator, Professor Markell, for-
merly Judge Markell, and even more formerly, "Bruce," whose dissenting opinion in Stic~a v. Applebaum 
(In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 694 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009), got me thinking about this topic. That said, 
any errors are, sadly, my own and not his. 
'See, e.g., John M.C;;arnet;;ky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Ban~ruptcy Discharge, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393 (2000) (proposing that the bankruptcy discharge is essential to fostering entrepreneur-
ship); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 91-104 
(1997) (emphasizing forgiveness as the explanation for the bankruptcy discharge); Charles G. Hallinan, The 
'Fresh Start' Policy in Consumer Ban~ruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretative Theory, 21 U. 
RicH. L. REv. 49 (1986) (reviewing the literature up to that time); Margaret Howard, A Theory of 
Discharge in Consumer Ban~ruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.]. 1047 (1987) (suggesting that discharge is necessary 
to restore the debtor to a participation in an open credit economy); Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) 
Ban~ruptcy7, 56 ALA. L. REv. 121 (2004) (urging that through amendment of non-bankruptcy collections 
laws, society could largely replicate the fresh start offered by the bankruptcy discharge without the need 
for any formal proceeding at all); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Ban~ruptcy Law, 98 HARV. 
L. REv. 1393 (1985) (viewing financial failure in the market as stemming from inherent volitional disabili-
ties or cognitive biases of individuals, which only a "paternalistic," "socially mandated" rule such as a 
nonwaivable discharge can solve by giving creditors the incentive to police debtors' credit decisions); 
Michael D. Sousa, The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory of Ban~ruptcy Discharge, 58 
U. KAN. L. REv. 553 (2010) (proposing a "consumer utility" theory of consumer bankruptcy); Charles 
Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Ban~ruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability 
Debate, 59 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 56 (1990) (reviewing the literature). See also Charles W. Mooney, A 
Normative Theory of Ban~ruptcy Law: Ban~ruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH LEE L. REv. 931, 1050 
(2004) (observing that, "Clearly no consensus exists as to the justification for the bankruptcy discharge 
and the debtor's corresponding fresh start. Theories abound-some are competing, some are complemen-
tary. Interestingly, there does seem to be agreement approaching consensus among many (but not all) 
academics that the discharge generally is justified, that current law has it about right .... "). 
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assailable reality is that we do have a consumer bankruptcy 'system, and one 
that simultaneously serves multiple purposive objectives. 2 In recent years, 
the circumstances under which relief may be sought, and by whom, have 
witnessed a significant contraction.3 Regardless, however, of whatever addi-
tional goals the system seeks to attain, and who is considered eligible for 
relief, the most notable consequence of the consumer bankruptcy system re-
mains the availability of the fresh start for a financially beleaguered individ-
ual,4 a construct without analog under state law.5 
2The bankruptcy law is intended to serve simultaneously as a more efficient and effective debt collec· 
tion device for creditors as well as a mechanism to provide relief to the financially distressed debtor. See 
Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Ban~ruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223, 225 (1918) (~All 
bankruptcy law ... no matter when or where devised and enacted, has at least two general objects in view 
.... [It] seeks to protect the creditors, first, from one another and, secondly, from their debtor. A third 
object, the protection of the honest debtor from his creditors, by means of the discharge, is sought to be 
attained in some of the systems of bankruptcy, but this is by no means a fundamental feature of the law."); 
Robert E. Scott & Thomas H. Jackson, On the Nature of Ban~ruptcy: An Essay on Ban~ruptcy Sharing and 
the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155 (1989). Indeed, voluntary bankruptcy and the concept of 
"discharge" are relatively recent features of the bankruptcy law, which, historically, was exclusively a 
creditors' remedy. See John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important Development in Ban~ruptcy 
History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.]. 163 (1996). · 
'Since 2005, under 11 U .S.C. § 707(b) debtors are "means tested" to determine their ability pay back 
all or a substantial portion of their debts. A debtor who is determined to be "can pay" is excluded from 
relief under Chapter 7 of Title 11, and must instead seek recourse, if at all, under Chapter 13 (requiring 
proposal and confirmation of a debt repayment plan). Judge Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time 
for Means- Testing, 1999 BYU L. REv. 177 ( 1999). The means test was controversial to say the least in 
terms of both its desirability and its effectiveness. See David G. Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed 
Ban~ruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 223 (2007) (arguing that the means test has 
driven up the cost to consumer debtors with no corresponding benefits either in terms of decreasing 
debtor abuses or increasing creditor pay outs). See generally, Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through 
Redux: 'The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INsT. L. REv 457, 458·59 n.3 (2005) (suggesting that some debtors who could easily pass the 
means test but, in the past would have chosen Chapter 13, will now elect relief under Chapter 7 because 
of the higher repayment requirements also imposed in 2005 to retain cars and other personal property 
collateral). 
4The phrase "fresh start" derives from the early twentieth century Supreme Court decision Local 
Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Bankruptcy gives "the honest but unfortunate debtor who 
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of ban~ruptcy, a new opportunity in life 
and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt." 
Id. (emphasis added). More recently, the Supreme Court referred to the fresh start as "the principal 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code." Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). 
In another context, I described the fresh start as "neither a formal legal status nor a cognizable right in the 
usual sense of the terms. Instead, it represents an aspiration of the bankruptcy system. It is the condition 
that is intended to result from application of specific bankruptcy rules in particular cases." Lawrence 
Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency Rules in Ban~ruptcy Dischargeability Liti· 
gation, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2515, 2519 (1996). 
5 A few of the American colonies, however, did offer a limited form of discharge. See Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Ban~ptcy, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 
605, 626 (2008) (citing PETER]. CoLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 14 (1974)). The 
federal Constitution specifically, bars the states from granting a general discharge by virtue of the Con· 
tract Clause, which forbids the states from retroactively passing laws that impair the obligation of con· 
2014) STATE-ENACTED BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION 355 
By dint of the U.S. Constitution, 6 bankruptcy law in this country is 
uniquely federal law in the sense that when Congress chases to legislate in 
the field,7 it does so to the exclusion of state law.8 And, yet, ever since the 
first long-standing federal bankruptcy law was enacted in 1898,9 state law 
has continued to play a vital interstitial role in defining the commercial rights, 
interests and entitlements of participants in the bankruptcy case. 10 Thus, it 
is not in the leastwise inconsistent to say that while state commercial law 
must yield to federal bankruptcy law; bankruptcy law cannot operate other 
than agains~ the backdrop of state commercial law. This creates, at certain 
times and in certain places, an uneasy co-existence and division of authority 
between the two systems. Perhaps nowhere is this lack of synchronicity as 
sharply in focus as in connection with the determination of the exemptions to 
tracts. U.S. CaNST. art. 1, §10, cl. 1. The concepts of voluntary bankruptcy for all debtors and discharge 
were also largely unknown in national bankruptcy legislation until the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. See 
generally Charles Jordan Tabb, 'The History of the Ban~ruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REv. 5, 16-18 (1995). 
6 U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See generally CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY 4 (1935) (suggesting that the location of the Bankruptcy Clause immediately after the. Commerce 
Clause was not accidental). 
7See Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892) ("So long as there is no national bankrupt act, each 
state has full authority to pass insolvent laws binding persons and property within its jurisdiction, pro-
vided it does not impair the obligation of existing contracts; but a state cannot by such a law discharge one 
of its own citizens from his contracts with citizens of other states ... ."). This principle was established 
early by Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193-96 (1819), 
although, just eight years later, and over the Chief Justice's dissent, the Court concluded that the prohibi-
tion only applied retrospectively. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. {12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
8The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress authority to preempt any 
state law that conflicts with the exercise of federal power. U.S. CaNST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Sturges, 17 
U.S. at 191 ("Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to congress, or the nature of the power, 
require that it should be exercised exclusively by congress, the subject is as completely taken from the 
state legislatures, as if they had been expressly forbidden to act ... ."). 
9Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 548, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
10 Although the Bankruptcy Clause clearly empowers Congress to define the substantive rights that 
interested parties in a bankruptcy case would enjoy against the debtor and inter se, Congress has not 
elected to enact a federal commercial law, thus leaving the determination of property rights in assets of a 
bankruptcy estate to state law, except where some federal interest compels a different right. See Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (holding that unless some federal interest requires a different result, 
state law should apply), superseded by statute as recognized in 11'! re White Plains Dev. Corp., 137 B.R. 139 
(Bankr. S.DN.Y. 1992). It is, however, easy to read Butner too broadly insofar as deference to state law is 
concerned. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Reclaim 'This! Getting Credit Seller Claims in Ban~ruptcy 
Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REv. 733, 789 (2014) ("[W]e all bow to Butner, but, in truth, the principle ·articu-
lated in Butner represents no more than a bias. By definition, then, it applies more often than not, but it is 
not an absolute that substitutes for reasoned analysis in each instance where federal and state law inter-
sect."). In In re NM Holdings Co., 407 B.R. 232 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2009), for instance, the court, relying 
on Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the scope of § 105(a), rejected the creditors' argument that the 
Butner principle deprived the court of authority to order substantive consolidation. The court noted there 
is an overriding federal interest in the equitable and efficient distribution of a debtor's property among its 
creditors, and, in the case of conflict with state property law, bankruptcy polii:y must prevail. Jd. at 277. 
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which a debtor who has filed under Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy 
Code11 is entitled to claim in her bankruptcy case; an area where Congress 
has explicitly deferred, but far from wholly yielded, to state law. 
The general awkwardness of the marriage between state and federal law 
in bankruptcy is exacerbated by the fact that, at their core, the two systems 
imagine a very different sort of problem to which each is responding. The 
former is concerned with balancing the respective rights of a creditor and a 
debtor in connection with a specific debt-collection matter. That is to say, it 
envisions a two-party dispute and endeavors to set the parameters governing 
the formal choreography of that particular contest. Federal bankruptcy law, 
by contrast, takes a much broader survey of the terrain. It addresses not only 
the correlative rights and obligations of the debtor vis-a-vis each of her credi· 
tors, but also the rights of all of those creditors inter seY Bankruptcy, in 
other words, is distinct from state law in that it is concerned with a collectiv· 
ized debt collection process in which considerations of equality of distribu· 
tion among, and maximization of value for, creditors (concerns to which state 
law is largely oblivious) all factor into a comprehensive and intricate scheme 
for wrapping up the debtor's prepetition financial life and, ideally, providing 
the debtor with a path to financial viability in the future. 13 
The history of exemption policy in American bankruptcy law is a long 
and largely undistinguished one, stained far more often by partisan political 
posturing and compromise than exemplified by high-minded principle. For 
instance, in 1970, Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy 
Law of the United States and charged it with a mandate to "study, evaluate 
and recommend changes to [the existing bankruptcy law ]."14 Roughly three 
years later, the Commission issued its final Report consisting of findings and 
recommendations in Part I, and a proposed reform bill in Part II. Among its 
11The current law of bankruptcy is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101· 
1530 (2012), as amended through Pub. L. No. 112·106, 126 Stat. 306 (amended 2012). It was enacted on 
November 6, 1978 as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95·598, 92 Stat. 2549, and governs 
all cases filed on or after October 1, 1979. In this Article, except where otherwise indicated, all references 
herein to the ~code" or the ~Bankruptcy Code" are to Title 11 of the United States Code as amended 
through January I, 2013. 
12See generally Vern Countryman, For a N_ew Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RuTGERS L. REv. 
678, 681 (1960) ("State exemption laws are not designed primarily for use in a system of orderly liquida· 
tion where all of the debtor's estate is to be converted to cash, but in a system of piecemeal liquidation 
where each creditor levies upon and sells such property as he can locate."); THOMAS H. jACKSON, THE 
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 2·4 (1986) (emphasizing the role of bankruptcy as a collective 
debt collection device to address the "common pool" problem that exists when the debtor's assets are 
insufficient to satisfy the demands of all of the debtor's creditors). 
13See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, 'The Immovable Object Versus the Irresistible 
Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2234, 
2290·91 (1997) (pointing out that it is the point of bankruptcy to draw a sharp line of demarcation; to 
close the books on the debtor's prepetition financial life). 
14Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91·354, 86 Stat. 468. 
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recommendations in Part I, the Commission urged that a uniform set of fed-
eral exemptions apply in all bankruptcy cases, superseding state and other 
nonbankruptcy federal laws granting or restricting exemptions. 15 The Com-
mission explained that even though the ability to exempt income and assets 
from administration was, along with the discharge of debts, an essential fea-
ture of the financial fresh start for individual debtors, the then-current Bank-
ruptcy Act's deference to applicable state and other federal exemption 
schemes meant that the exemptions available in any given case were the re-
sult not of "reasoned policy," but rather of the serendipity of "history and 
location." 16 This, the Commission concluded, was intolerable under what is 
supposed to be a uniform, national system, and represented a situation that 
the Commission described as destructive "to the goal of rehabilitation of indi-
vidual debtors." 17 
The Commission's recommendation regarding exemptions was greeted 
with a firestorm of opposition, largely political in origin.18 The compromise 
ultimately reached to secure enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 is the approach of election and opt-out that persists to the present 
day. 19 That is, the debtor is given the option to choose either to have her 
exemptions determined under a set of federal bankruptcy exemptions set 
forth in § 522(d) of the Code or under applicable state (and other federal 
nonbankruptcy) law.20 The states, in turn, have their own option; the Code 
15CoMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY 
LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 170-173 (1973). 
16Id. at 169. 
17Id. Of particular relevance to the position advanced in this article, the Report also pointed out that 
the use of nonbankruptcy law to determine the exemptions had, "contrary to the goals of federal bank-
ruptcy legislation, allowed some creditors to be preferred over others and caused substantial 
nonuniformity." I d. at 171. It is interesting to note that the Executive Director of the Commission was 
Professor Frank Kennedy who, a bit more than a decade earlier, had penned a law review article support-
ing the states' interest in defining exemptions over the effectiveness and uniformity that might be derived 
from "superimposing designation or limitation on exemptions ... ." Frank R. Kennedy, Limitations of 
Exemptions in Ban~ruptcy, 45 IowA L. REv. 445, 451 (1960). For a sharply conflicting view written 
about the same time, see Countryman, supra note 12, at 683 (describing state exemptions at the time as 
obsolete "both in the type of property exempted and in the amount of the value limits"). 
18The objections were predicated nominally on historic states' rights arguments, as well as a fear that 
mandatory federal exemptions would trigger an enormous increase in bankruptcy filings, either by debtors 
in states with less generous exemptions from judgment execution, or by creditors in states whose exemp-
tions were more generous than those allowed under the federal scheme. See Hon. William H. Brown, 
Political and Ethical Considerations of Exemptions Limitations: The "Opt-Out" as Child of the First and 
Parent of the Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.]. 149 (1997); Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale 
of Two Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 223 (1997). See also infra text accompanying notes 244-247. 
19For discussion of the background and the legislative history surrounding the Code's approach to 
exemptions, see James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522's Opt-Out Clause: Debtors' Ban~ruptcy Exemptions in a 
Sorry State, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6-10 (1983). See also TERESA A. SuLLIVAN ET AL., As WE FoRGIVE 
OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 28 (1989) (suggesting that, "Con-
gress once again sidestepped a sticky political issue by leaving the decision to state legislatures."). 
20 As suggested in the text, the alternative to § 5 22( d) for a debtor is the exemptions provided for 
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confers authority on the states to adopt legislation barring their residents 
who become bankruptcy debtors from electing the federal bankruptcy exemp-
tions set forth in § 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. This is the so-called 
"opt-out"' provision of§ 522(b)(2),2 1 of which thirty-four states have availed 
themselves.22 Debtors in these jurisdictions must have their exemptions de-
fined by state la,w, as was the practice under the former Bankruptcy Act.23 
In 1994, Congress created another blue-ribbon commission, the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "'NBRC"'), to study and recommend 
changes to the Code.24 In its 1997 Report,25 the NBRC recommended sev-
eral modifications in the provisions governing exemptions allowable to debt-
ors in bankruptcy. Chief among them, however, was, once more, the 
recommendation of greater uniformity and coherence by means of enhanced 
federal preemption over the determination of exemptions in bankruptcy.26 
The NBRC's recommendations in the exemption arena were intended to as-
sure minimum adequate exemptions for debtors in states with very restrictive 
exemption laws, and simultaneously to control abusive prebankruptcy plan-
ning involving the use of overly generous or unlimited exemptions in other 
states. 
The NBRC's recommendations regarding exemptions, like virtually all of 
its other recommendations, essentially were ignored, as the lobby for con-
sumer creditor organizations anticipated and attempted to ambush the major-
under federal non-bankruptcy law as well as state law, plus (I) exemptions applicable to property held as 
tenants by the entireties or joint tenants; and, since. 2005 (2) most types of tax-exempt retirement assets. 
See Code§§ 523(b)(3)(B) and (C). In the interests of convenience and simplicity of presentation, how· 
ever, and because in the vast majority of instances it is also what matters principally, the article frequently 
uses the phrase "state law" as a shorthand reference to all exemptions available to a debtor under Code 
§ 522(b)(3), and should be so regarded when the context requires. 
21 The pertinent language of the statute provides that exempt property shall be as listed under 
§ 522( d), "unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph 3(A) [of this section] 
specifically does not so authorize." 
22ln addition to the seventeen non·opt states, the District of Columbia and each of the U.S. territories 
have chosen not to opt·out, thus permitting their citi•ens who file for bankruptcy to elect between state 
and federal exemptions. See WILLIAM HousTON BROWN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY ExEMPTION MANUAL 
App. C (West 2010). 
2
'See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
24See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103·394, tit. VI, §603, lOS Stat. 4106, 4147. 
25NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW CoMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS (1997) (NBRC 
Report). 
. 
26Specifically, the Commission recommended elimination of the opt·out and that exemptions of income 
and personal property be determined under the federal bankruptcy law, with the exemption stated in a 
single, lump-sum cash amount (except for special categories of personalty, such as professionally prescribed 
medical devices and health aids) with the debtor to determine how the cash allowance is to be allocated. 
Id. at 105·116. As for the homestead exemption in bankruptcy, the Report called for it to continue to be 
governed by applicable state law, but subject to a federally-imposed floor and ceiling. I d. at 121-144. In 
the interests of full disclosure, the NBRC's recommendations regarding exemptions largely followed the 
analysis that had been prepared by Judge William H. Brown and me. See G.i.b to the NBRC Report, 
available at http:/ I govinfo.library .unt.edu/nbrc/ report/ g1 b.pdf. 
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ity report by pressing furiously for the introduction of bipartisan legislation 
that advanced the views of the four dissenting members of the Commission.27 
They were ultimately successful. That legislative proposal, and it successors, 
dominated the conversation over the next several years, and eventually re-
sulted in the enactment in 2005 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA).28 As opposed to the NBRC's bal-
anced and straightforward approach to exemption policy in bankruptcy, 
BAPCP A characteristically ignored the issue of minimally sufficient exemp-
tions for debtors residing in opt-out states with miserly exemptions,29 and, in 
its uniquely inelegant style,30 established an elaborate, confusing, and dread-
fully convoluted scheme for attempting to control the practice of abusing 
high dollar or unlimited state exemptions through forum-shopping and the 
excessive conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt form on the eve of 
bankruptcy.31 
27NBRC Report, supra note 25, at 1029, et seq. (Individual Commissioner views). See generally A. 
Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Ban~ruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology, & Beyond, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 
1861, 1865 (2006) (noting that before the NBRC's Report was even filed, the credit lobby found support· 
ers in the 105th Congress to sponsor legislation adopting the views of the dissenting Commissioners). 
28Pub. L. No. 109·8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
BAPCPA became fully effective for cases filed on or after Oct. 17, 2005. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative 
History of the Ban~ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
485, 512·15 (2005) (tracing the progression of the bills, beginning with the 1997 bill that preempted the 
NBRC's Report, that eventually resulted in the passage of BAPCP A). 
291 say "characteristically" because BAPCPA was widely (and not inaccurately) criticized as having 
been bought and paid for by the consumer credit industry. See, e.g., 151 CoNe. REC. S2216 (daily ed. Mar. 
8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 CoNe. REc. H2084 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
McDermott). While this may be a bit of an overstatement, and despite the "consumer protection" Ian· 
guage in its title, no one would argue that BAPCP A was other than a creditors' bill. See Milavetz, Gallop 
& Milavetz, PA. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231·32 (2010) (noting that Congress enacted BAPCPA 
in order "to correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system."). 
30See Ponoroff, supra note 10, at 733·34 (describing BAPCPA as "clumsily drafted, unnecessarily 
prolix, internally inconsistent, and annealed in a cauldron of special interest pressures."). See also Braucher, 
supra note 3, at 457 n.3 (noting that some have taken to calling BAPCPA "by the fanciful acronym BARF 
(BAnkrutcy ReForm Act)"). 
31 Instead of responding to the problem by the simple expedient of capping the homestead exemption as 
recommended by the NBRC, BAPCPA extended from 91 to 730 days the number of days prior to filing 
that a debtor must reside in a state in order to claim that state's exemptions. See Code § 522(b)(3)(A). In 
addition,§ 522(p)(1) was added to the Code by BAPCPA, providing that with respect to real property 
acquired by the debtor within the 1215-day period prior to bankruptcy, and claimed by the debtor under 
state law as a homestead, the exemption may not ex.ceed $125,000 (subsequently indexed to $155,675 as 
of April 1, 2013). Finally, to deal with homestead property acquired outside the 12l5·day period: (1) 
§ 5 22( o )( 4) of the Code provides a ten-year disallowance for exemptions obtained by means of the fraudu· 
lent conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt form; and (2) § 522(q)(1) also limits the homestead exemp· 
tion to $155,675, and imposes other possible sanctions for debtors guilty of felony demonstrating that "the 
filing of the case was an abuse of the provisions of this title," or one of the enumerated acts of wrongdoing, 
including securities fraud, in§ 522(q)(1)(B). This is the so-called "Enron" provision, supposedly aimed at 
ensuring that executives guilty of the kind of contretemps as were involved in that case are not able in the 
future to shield enormous amounts of assets through state exemption laws. See CHARLES jORDAN T ABB, 
LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 9.5, 897 (3d. ed. 2013). 
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The next chapter in the pull and tug between state and federal authority 
over the issue of exemptions developed in a manner not contemplated by the 
Code and likely never anticipated even by the early supporters of state he-
gemony over the determination of exempt property in bankruptcy. Specifi-
cally, just as the legitimacy (albeit perhaps not the wisdom) of the Code's 
opt-out scheme became settled policy,32 the courts began to grapple with the 
constitutionality of special state-promulgated bankruptcy-specific exemp-
tions, a phenomenon dating back to 1980,33 but one that has proliferated in 
the last decade or so.34 Under the typical pattern, a debtor who elects, or is 
required by state opt-out legislation, to have her exemptions defined by state 
law is allowed to claim often more favorable exemptions in her bankruptcy 
case than the exemptions from conventional judgment execution to which she 
otherwise would have been entitled in that jurisdiction absent a bankruptcy 
filing. 
These bankruptcy-specific exemption statutes have been challenged, suc-
cessfully on some occasions,35 on constitutional grounds, but two circuit 
courts of appeal,36 and two bankruptcy appellate panels37 have now held that 
32 See authorities cited infra note 61. 
33 See infra notes 65 ·66 and accompanying text. 
34See, e.g., Heather M. Forrest, Are Ban~ruptcy·Specific State Exemptions ConstitutionaP, XXXI ABI 
JouRNAL 10, 14, 86 (November 2012) (discussing the legislative history of the Michigan statute that 
became effective in 2005). 
3
'See In re Reinhart, 460 B.R. 466 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Pontius, 421 B.R. 814 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2009); In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). Compare In reCross, 255 B.R. 25 
(Bankr. D. Ind. 2000), In re Reynolds, 24 B.R. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982), and In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 
736 (Bankr. D. Az. 2008) (all striking a state-enacted bankruptcy statute on the basis of the Supremacy 
Clause), with In re Mata, 115 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) and In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 1987) (both declaring bankruptcy-specific state exemption laws invalid under the Supreme Court's 
definition of uniformity, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Clause, established in Hanover f{at'l Ban~ v. 
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902)). These decisions are now all either superseded or, even if not abrogated by 
subsequent authority, cast into some doubt by virtue of later nonbinding negative authority. See cases 
cited infra notes 36·37. Commentators have also questioned the lawfulness of bankruptcy-only state legis· 
lation. See, e.g., Joseph Lamport. The Preemption of Ban~ptcy·Only Exemptions, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 
583, 584·85 (1985) (arguing that the plenary bankruptcy power granted to Congress completely preempts 
states from creating bankruptcy-specific exemptions); Edward Stechschulte, Comment, The 
(Un)constitutionality of State-Enacted Ban~ptcy·Specific Exemptions: Using Ohio Revised Code Section 
2329.66(A)(l8) as a Mechanism for Analysis, 40 U. ToL. L. REv. 761 (2009). 
36Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied. 133 S. Ct. 1244 
(2013); Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2009). In addition, in Kulp v. Zeman (In re Kulp), 949 
F.2d 1106 (lOth Cir. 1991), the court rejected the trustee's challenge to a Colorado statute that permitted 
a debtor, "only for purposes of claiming an exemption in bankruptcy,~ an exemption for pension or retire-
ment benefits, including an IRA. In a footnote, that court also rejected an alternative argument raised by 
the trustee challenging the state statute on the basis of the uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy 
Clause. /d. at 1109 n.3. The court observed that both Mata and Lennen, on which the trustee relied, 
misapprehended the holding in Moyses. Id. See also infra notes 153·154 and accompanying text. 
37Williamson v. Westby (In re Westby), 486 B.R. 509 (BA.P. lOth Cir. 2013); Sticka v. Applebaum 
(In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
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these bankruptcy-only laws neither impinge on Congress' constitutional au-
thority to enact ~uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcy," nor are pre-
empted by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.38 The 
decision in the most recent of these courts of appeal cases, In re Schafer,39 
from the U.S. Sixth Circuit, is perhaps the most compelling in that the careful 
opinion is authored by R. Guy Cole, Jr., who is not only a respected circuit 
judge, but one who previously enjoyed a distinguished career as a bankruptcy 
practitioner and judge. 
Nonetheless, in this article it is alternatively argued that these state law 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions are constitutionally suspect, and, in any 
event, add further grist to the mill in support of the now forty-plus year 
effort to supplant state law with a system of mandatory uniform federal ex-
emptions in bankruptcy. Part I begins with a brief overview of the history of 
exemption legislation and policy under federal bankruptcy law. Part II then 
examines the case law addressing the lawfulness of state law exemptions ap-
plicable only in bankruptcy, with particular emphasis on Judge Cole's opinion 
in. Schafer. Part III analyzes more closely the constitutional considerations 
implicated by these provisions, concluding that the issues are serious and sub-
stantial, and likely to vex bankruptcy practice for some time to come. Lastly, 
Part IV updates and renews the case in favor of "federalizing" policy in this 
area. It urges that the constitutional showdown over bankruptcy-specific ex-
emptions can and should be avoided by finally taking this step; that the politi-
cal environment for doing so is favorable; and that the result would be a 
system that not only assures greater uniformity, but also one that advances 
the federal bankruptcy policies of equity, equality, and rehabilitation in a far 
more powerful and effectual fashion than the current regime. 
II. BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The ability to protect exempt assets, however defined, together with the 
discharge of the debtor's in personam liability,4° represent the principal com-
ponents of the bankruptcy fresh start,41 although several subsidiary aspects of 
38The Supremacy Clause appears in U.S. CoNST. art VI, cL 2, and, in pertinent part, provides that: 
"[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land." As a consequence, any act of a state legislature that interferes with, or 
is contrary to the laws enacted by Congress under its constitutional authority is invalid. Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824). 
39See supra note 36. 
40See Code § 727(a). 
41 See Ponoroff, supra note 4, at 2519-20 (identifying the fresh start as an "aspiration of the bankruptcy 
system" rather than a formal legal status or cognizable right, but referring to the discharge as the "defining 
aspect of the fresh start"). 
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the fresh start doctrine can be found and are implemented by other provisions 
of the Code.42 Every state, of course, also recognizes today the need or desir-
ability for certain property and/or income to be immune from execution by 
judgment creditors,43 although these exemption schemas vary widely in 
scope, content, and amount.44 As is not uncommon in a federal system, ex-
emptions in bankruptcy operate differently than they do under state law. 
Most notably, in a bankruptcy case, exempt assets are immune not from exe-
cution, as under state law, but rather from liquidation by the trustee and 
distribution to creditors.45 Thus, the exempt assets, or in some instances a 
portion of the value of such assets,46 remain with the debtor to prime her 
fresh start. Further, these assets remain permanently free from execution to 
42These include the ability to avoid certain exemption-impairing liens under Code § 522(1); the protec-
tion against discriminatory treatment in Code § 525; and the right of redemption under Code § 722. Cf 
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Ban~ruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment 
of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 405, 415-16 n.39 (2005) (expressing the view 
that the discharge in bankruptcy by itself constitutes the fresh start, and that other provisions of the Code 
· that relate to the fresh start do so only in the sense of its implementation and protection, rather than its 
substance). 
43 Actually, exemption laws date back to Roman times. See Levinthal, supra note 2, at 238,. Although 
bankruptcy law began in England purely as a creditors' collection remedy, the Act of 4 Anne, ch. 17 
( 1705), first authorized bankrupts to keep their clothing and up to 5% of their remaining property as 
. exempt from their creditors. S~e Emily Kadens, 'The Last Ban~rupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the 
Development of Ban~ruptcy La..,;, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229 (2010). 
44Property exemptions can be determined by type, category, dollar amount, or, quite commonly, a type 
but subject to a maximum dollar amount limit, e.g., "one automobile up to a value of $5,000." Although 
now out-of-date, the wide variety and disparities in exemption schemas are illustrated by the state by state 
comparison set forth in Brown, supra note 18, at 218-19 (App. II). The current exemption laws of all 50 
states, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, are collected in Vols. 12 & '13, CoLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY (16th ed. 20!3). While many states'have updated and modernized their exemptions laws 
since the adoption of the Code, see infra note 248, significant differences persist. For instance, the home-
stead exemption in Alabama, an opt-out jurisdiction, is currently limited $5,000 ($10,000 for a married 
couple entitled to claim separately). ALA. CoDE§ 6-10-2. As noted, by contrast, in Texas, the homestead 
exemption remains limited only by acreage (up to 200 acres in non-urban areas). TEx. CoNST. arts. 50 & 
· 51. Thus, the fresh start for a Mobile-based debtor can be quite different from her counterpart in Dallas. 
45See generally' Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 694 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) 
(Markell, J., dissenting) (noting the significance of this distinction in terms of avoiding interference with 
the federal bankruptcy distribution scheme); Brown, supra note 18, at 181 (observing that in contrast to 
the single creditor orientation of non-bankruptcy exemptions, bankruptcy is designed to offer relief as to ' 
creditor collection efforts in general); Countryman, sup;a note 12; William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemp-
tion Rights Under the Ban~ruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. Rev. 769, 802 (1980) (describing the different 
function of exemptions under, respectively, state and federal bankruptcy law). This, in part, explains why 
the Bankruptcy Code's deference to state law in the area of exemptions is far from complete. For instance, 
while the granting a security interest in property is implicitly a subordination of the exemption to the 
extent of the secured debt, in bankruptcy that rule is subject to the debtor's ability to avoid certain 
exemption impairing liens under § 522(1). See also infra text accompanying notes 222-224 for additional 
examples. 
46While we commonly talk of property as being exempt or non-exempt, in many, if not most cases, the 
exemption is subject to a dollar-denominated cap, such that "exempt property" is often sold so that the 
value in excess of the dollar limitation can be realized upon either by the executing creditor or the bank-
ruptcy trustee. 
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satisfy virtually all prepetition claims, including those deemed to be nondis-
chargeable, even after the bankruptcy case is concluded.47 
The earliest bankruptcy legislation in the United States, the Bankruptcy 
Acts of 180148 and 1841,49 each established a uniform set offederal exemp-
tions that preempted the exemption laws of the debtor's state of residence. so 
The last of the short-term American bankruptcy laws, the Bankruptcy Act of 
1867,51 provided for a limited set of federal exemptions, but also, forth~ first 
time, allowed the debtor (then known as the "bankrupt"52) to claim her appli-
cable state law exemptions as well.53 The issue of whether state or federal 
exemptions would control in nineteenth century bankruptcy legislation was 
contentious; an artifact of the larger battle between agrarian interests in the 
Old South and the West, which generally sought to curb any expansion of 
federal power over debt collection law, and the largely urban, commercial 
interests in the Northeast, which typically lobbied for more effective national 
legislation. 54 
As observed earlier, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 abandoned entirely any' 
federal definition of exempt property and instead simply deferred to applica-
ble state law when it came to defining the exemptions to which the bankrupt 
47See Code § 522(c), which other than four enumerated categories of debts, sets forth the general rule 
that property determined to be exempt under § 522 is not liable, during or after the case, for any debt that 
arose (or is deemed to have arose) prior to filing of the petition, regardless of what state law has to say in 
relation to limitations on exempt property .. Of course, because of the-discharge, even if property is con· 
verted after the case to nonexempt form it remains-unlike under state law-beyond the reach of most 
prepetition creditors. 
48Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6,2 Stat. 248. 
49Until the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, nineteenth century bankruptcy legislation represented short· 
term responses to financial turmoil (or panics) that were quickly repealed by Congress as soon as the crises 
passed. See generally DAviD A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT's DoMINION: A HisTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw IN 
AMERICA 24·28 (2001). 
50 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed). For discussion of the early American 
bankruptcy legislation, see Vern Countryman, A History of American Ban~ruptcy Law, 81 Com. L.J 226 
(1976); Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Ban~ruptcy in the United States, 96.CoM. L.J 166 (1991); Tabb, supra 
note 5, at 12·18. 
51 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, 523, repealed by Act of]une 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. 
52lndeed, the term "bankrupt" to refer to the party subject to the proceeding persisted until it was 
replaced by the less pejorative term "debtor" by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Code 
§ 101(13). 
53 Section 14 of the Act gave the bankruptcy assignee (now the trustee) title to all of the bankrupt's 
property, save for certain necessaries, not to exceed in value $500, together with "such other property as 
now is, or hereafter shall be, exempted from ... execution ... by the laws of the State in which the 
bankrupt has his domicile." See also CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 106· 
07 ( 193 5) (explaining that the preservation of state property exemptions in bankruptcy was necessary to 
appease conflicting factions in Congress, and that the constitutionality concerns, though raised, were 
squelched based, prophetically, on the same reasoning as the Supreme Court would adopt in Moyses). 
54See, WARREN, supra note 6, at 8·9,.17·19. Cf Skeel, supra 49, at 28·32 (suggesting that the bank· 
ruptcy debates of the nineteenth century involved a multiplicity of often shifting views, rather than a 
clearly delineated battle between bankruptcy proponents and opponents). 
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would be entitled.55 Section 6 provided that, "This Act shall not affect the 
allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by the State 
laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they 
have had their domicile for the six months immediately preceding the filing of 
the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than in any other 
State."56 While heralded as a victory for states' rights,5 7 the 1898 Act's ap-
proach introduced considerable disuniformity in terms of the type and extent 
of property that debtors from different states might retain following bank-
ruptcy. This created a serious question at the time (and perhaps still today 
with respect to opt-out states) as to whether the Act's reliance on state 
exemptions, with no prescribed federal bankruptcy additions, was constitu-
tional. In 1902, however, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Hano-
ver National Ban~ v. Moyses, 58 rejected a challenge to the Act based on the 
uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. In 
that decision, the Court interpreted the Bankruptcy Clause as demanding 
only geographic and not intrinsic, personal uniformity.59 Thus, the Court 
concluded that "the general operation of the law is uniform although it may 
result in certain particulars differently in different states."60 After enactment 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, several courts relied on the holding in 
Moyses to sustain the constitutionality of the election and opt-out provisions 
55The National Bankruptcy Conference, a private organization composed of prominent bankruptcy 
lawyers, judges, and academics, considered proposing abandonment of the deferral to state exemptions in 
connection with the Chandler Act of 1938, which amended the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Given that the 
Chandler Act was being crafted at the height of the Great Depression, this made eminent sense, but, 
according to Professor Koffler, the Conference ultimately backed off pushing for mandatory federal exemp· 
tions for fear that it would derail political support for the Act in its entirety. See Judith Schenck Koffler, 
'The Ban~ruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22, 26 n.lO (1983). 
56Quite appropriately, the courts construed this language as essentially calling for deferral to state 
exemption laws in bankruptcy. E.g., Smalley v. Laugenour, 196 U.S. 93, 97 (1905). 
57 See SKEEL, supra note 49, at 42 (commenting that incorporating state exemptions, a point of particu· 
lar emphasis to southern legislators and a disappointment to most creditors, was likely the only way to get 
the Act passed). 
58 186 U.S. 181 (1902). The plaintiffs in Moyses also urged that§ 6 of the Act represented an uncon· 
stitutional delegation of power to the states, but the court gave short shrift to the argument, noting that 
the reference to "the local law in the matter of exemptions ... [was not an] attempt by Congress to 
unlawfully delegate its legislative power." /d. at 190. 
59/d. at 188. See also Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982) ("(U]niformity 
does not require the elimination of any differences among the States in their laws governing commercial 
transactions."). 
60Moyses 186 U.S. at 190. See Koffler. supra note 55, at 95·96 (arguing that the Moyses Court's 
analysis was ahistorical and sacrificed the national interest in favor of the local, parochial concerns of the 
states). Professor Countryman earlier expressed a similar view. See Countryman, supra note 12, at 680·81 
(suggesting that the Court equated requirement of uniformity to a requirement of fairness, and avoided 
any critical examination of the constitutionality of the system). See also infra text accompanying notes 
142·145. 
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in Code§ 522(b) under the standard of geographical uniformity.61 It is, how-
ever, imperative to note that those decisions, like the Court's decision in 
Moyses, did not address the related, but in terms of its entailments quite 
different, question of whether states may enact exemptions that apply only in 
bankruptcy. 
B. BANKRUPTCY-ONLY EXEMPTION STATUTES 
While all sharing the same moniker, so-called "bankruptcy-specific stat-
utes" come in a confusing array of diverse configurations. They range from 
comprehensive collections of exemptions (separate and apart from the state's 
general exemptions) applicable only to bankruptcy debtors, to discrete in-
come or property exemptions that augment the jurisdiction's general exemp-
tions in the case of a bankruptcy filing. States with some form of bankruptcy-
specific exemption(s) include both opt-out and non-opt-out jurisdictions. The 
complexity is exacerbated by uncertainty over whether, in states with com-
prehensive bankruptcy-specific schemes, these exemptions are exclusive of or 
in addition to the state's general exemptions.62 It is not the purpose of this 
article to provide an all-encompassing survey of these statutes. Such an exer-
cise would not only fail to advance the main thesis in this study, but would 
also be of limited utility given the ever-changing nature of the landscape.63 A 
61See Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that§ 522(b)(1) represents "an 
exercise of the legislative prerogative to establish a 'uniform law' and therefore falls within that scope of 
authority provided to Congress in the Bankruptcy Clause"); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1135 (7th Cir. 
1982); Kosto v. Lausch (In re Lausch), 16 B.R. 162 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Butcher, 189 B.R. 357, 370-72 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1995); In re Snape, 172 B.R. 361, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (concluding that the 
differences between the former Act and the Code in the designation of property of the estate did not 
render Moyses inapplicable insofar as the constitutionality of state determined exemptions is concerned). 
The court in Butcher also rejected the creditor's alternative contention that § 522(b) violates the "Due 
Process" Clause of the Fifth Amendment, finding that the provision is rationally related to Congress' 
"legitimate purposes in enacting the bankruptcy laws." Butcher, 189 B.R. at 372. But see Daniel A. Aus-
tin, Ban~ruptcy and the Myth of"Unifonn Laws,"42 SETON HALL L. REv. 1081 (2012) (making the case 
that the direct incorporation of state law into the Bankruptcy Code violates the bankruptcy uniformity 
requirement); Koffler, supra note 55, at 87-105 (arguing, based on the original intent of the Framers, that 
the Moyses doctrine and § 522(b) improperly sacrifice federal policy and predominating national interest 
to the parochial interests of the states); Tracey Nicolau Bosomworth, Note, Federal Exemptions and the 
Opt-Out Provisions of Section 522: A Constitutional Challenge, 58 IND. L.]. 143 (1982/83) (asserting that 
the opt-out alternative in § 522(b) represents a marked expansion of the practice under § 6 of the former 
Act and does not conform with any constitutionally acceptable method for deferring to state law). 
62See infra text accompanying notes 85-90. 
6
'Such compilations are available from other sources. See., e.g., supra note 44; 50 State Homestead 
Exemptions & Other Ban~ruptcy Exemptions, LEGALCONSUMER.COM, http:/ /www.legalconsumer.com/ 
bankruptcy/laws/ (last visited June 18, 2014). In Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 455 B.R. 590, 599 
n.lO (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011), rev'd, 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013), the 
BAP identified eight states other than Michigan that have adopted bankruptcy-only exemption schemas. 
That ignores, however, states, like Kansas and New York, which have taken the approach of augmenting 
the state's general exemptions for bankruptcy debtor's from those jurisdictions. See infra notes 78-79 and 
accompanying text. 
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few illustrative examples should suffice to provide an overview of the myriad 
of differing approaches that have been taken, although at least one broad 
generalization can be made; namely, that, to this point in time, state-enacted 
bankruptcy-specific exemptions are, overall, more generous to debtors than the 
states' garden variety judgment-execution exemptions. 64 
The first state to adopt bankruptcy-specific exemptions was Georgia in 
1980-just about one year following the effective date of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978.65 The state's legislature enacted the bankruptcy-spe-
cific exemption scheme simultaneously with its action to opt-out of allowing 
Georgia debtors to claim the federal bankruptcy exemptions. At the time, 
the Georgia exemptions applicable to debtors in state collection proceedings 
were, relatively speaking, paltry, although they have been increased in recent 
years.66 By contrast, the Georgia exemptions designed to shield property 
from administration in a bankruptcy proceeding were much more robust than 
the generally available exemptions, to a large degree paralleling the Bank-
ruptcy Code's exemptions in§ 522(d).67 The exact reasons for opting-out of 
the federal scheme, but then adopting a set of bankruptcy-limited exemptions 
comparable to § 522(d), is not altogether clear68 What is, however, quite 
apparent is that from the get-go Georgia did not have an issue with debtors 
being able to protect more property in bankruptcy than could be protected in 
connection with ordinary judgment execution. 
Michigan has always been a non-opt out jurisdiction whose citizens may 
64But see infra notes 66 and 90 (identifying at least one circumstance where the bankruptcy-specific 
scheme was not as generous as the state's general exemption for the same type of property). See also infra 
text accompanying notes 193-195 (suggesting that in some instances it may be difficult, if not impossible, 
to tell if a particular exemption scheme is regularly more or less generous than the state's general exemp-
tions). Finally, the fact that to date bankruptcy-specific legislation largely has been, or at least intended to 
be, more liberal than the state's non-bankruptcy exemptions is no guarantee that, in the future, a state 
might decide to discourage its residents from filing bankruptcy by promulgating a mandatory, less generous 
scheme that applies only in bankruptcy. 
65 Although enacted in 1978, The Bankruptcy Reform Act did not generally become effective on Octo-
ber 1, 1979 in order to allow for a sufficient period of transition and so as to coincide with the commence-
ment of a new governmental fiscal year. 
66The Georgia Constitution provides for a lump-sum cash value exemption of $1,600. GA. CoNST. art. 
1 § I. XXVI. In addition, GA. CODE ANN. § 44-13-1 now also exempts any real or personal property of a 
debtor in the amount of $5,000, or $21,500 for "real or personal property that is the debtor's primary 
residence." Further, outside of bankruptcy, the cash surrender value of life insurance policies of Georgia 
debtors are not immune from attachment, whereas the bankruptcy-specific, GA. CoDE ANN. § 44-13-
100(a)(9) scheme imposes a dollar limitation on the exemption for the cash value of any unmatured life 
insurance contract. See In re Joyner, 489 B.R. 292 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012) (holding that the debtors in the 
case were restricted to the more limited exemption provided for in the state's bankruptcy-specific scheme). 
67GA. CoDE ANN. § 44-13-100(a)(1) was amended May 2, 2012, to raise the homestead exemption 
from $10,000 ($20,000 for married couples) to $21,500 ($43,000 for married couples). 
68The aim of preventing joint debtors from stacking exemptions, which accounted for the bankruptcy-
specific exemptions in California, may have been a factor. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. Like-
wise, political pressure from local creditors may have played a hand. See infra note 83. 
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claim either the federal bankruptcy exemptions in § 522(d) or the state ex-
emptions in§ 600.6023 of the Michigan Compiled Laws rMCL"). Without 
much by way of explanation,69 in 2005, the Michigan legislature adopted a 
completely new table of exemptions in MCL § 600.5451 available to: "[a] 
debtor in bankruptcy under the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. 101 to 
1532 .... "7° While there are other important differences between the state's 
preexisting general exemptions and the new bankruptcy separate exemp-
tions,71 the most significant point of departure is between the $3,500 home-
stead exemption for the debtor's personal residence under MCL 
§ 600.6023(g) versus a $30,000 homestead exemption ($45,000 if the debtor 
is elderly or disabled) under the bankruptcy-specific statute.72 
Like Michigan, California has a set of exemptions that are available only 
to bankruptcy debtors,73 but, unlike Michigan, California is an opt-out juris-
diction. Also, unlike Georgia, ~here one set of exemptions appears by law to 
pertain in state collections actions and the other in bankruptcy cases,74 a 
California bankruptcy debtor is expressly. given the option to elect between 
the state's general exemptions or the bankruptcy-only exemptions listed in 
§ 703.140(b) of the California Civil Procedure Code, subject solely to the 
limitation that married debtors must rely on the same set of exemptions.75 
The bankruptcy-only exemptions are more than coincidentally similar to the 
federal bankruptcy exemptions in § 522(d). They are crafted effectively to 
allow a California debtor the choice between the state and federal bank-
ruptcy exemptions, but, because of the limitations requiring joint debtors to 
elect the same scheme, they prevent joint debtors from maximiz;ing their ex-
69See Winnifred P. Boylan & Melanie R. Byers, The Tre~ of Michigan Exemptions in the Universe of 
Ban/cruptcy, 33 MICH. REAL PROP. REv. 85 (2006) (observing that the charge of the Advisory Commit· 
tee, formed in response to a request of the Michigan House of Representatives" Civil Law and Judiciary 
Subcommittee, was to review and provide recommendations to update the property exemption laws, and 
that there is no explanation as to why the resulting recommendations, ultimately resulting in MICH. 
CoMP. LAws § 600.5451, focused exclusively on bankruptcy cases). It does, however, seem clear that 
effort was designed to liberalize exemption policy in the state. See Shapiro v. Sassak (In re Sassak), 426 B.R. 
680, 688·89 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (reviewing the legislative history). 
7°MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 600.5451(1). 
71 For a detailed comparison of the respective exemption schemes, see Boylan & Byers, supra note 69. 
72MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.5451(1)(n). 
73CAL. Civ. PROc. CoDE § 703.140(b) (2013). 
74See GA. CoDE. ANN. § 44·13·21, which appears to make the bankruptcy and most of the state's 
nonbankruptcy exemptions mutually exclusive. But cf. infra note 90. 
75See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 703.140(a) (2013). Unlike in Georgia where the bankruptcy-specific 
scheme will almost always be more attractive to a debtor than the state's general exemptions, depending 
on the manner in which the debtor's assets are configured, the bankruptcy-specific schema in California 
could be less advantageous than the general schema. For example," CAL. Civ. PROC. CoDE § 704.040 
exempts jewelry, heirlooms, and works of art up to (currently) $7,625, whereas the bankruptcy-only ex· 
emptions in § 703.140(b)( 4) permits an exemption for jewelry up to $1,525 in amount, although 
§ 703.140(b)(5) includes a wildcard exemption for any property up to a value of $1,350 plus any unused 
portion of the homestead exemption. 
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emptions by engaging in what is known as "stacking"; a practice involving the 
expansion of exempt property by having each spouse elect to have his or her 
exemptions determined under different schemas.76 Under the Code as origi-
nally enacted in 1978, debtors in non-opt jurisdictions could stack exemp-
tions by having one spouse choose the § 522(d) exemptions and the other to 
have his or her exemptions determined by state law. Although the ability to 
stack exemptions has been foreclosed under the Code since 1986,77 California 
has retained both its opt-out status and its separate scheme of bankruptcy-
only exemptions. 
In contrast to all of the previously described state bankruptcy-only stat-
utes is the approach taken in Kansas.78 Specifically, in 2011, the Kansas legis-
lature added to the exemptions otherwise generally available to Kansas 
debtors the right in bankruptcy to also exempt a federal tax refund based on 
earned income credit (EIC).79 In other words, Kansas debtors who file for 
bankruptcy may, in addition to other state exemptions, exempt their EIC, but 
Kansas debtors who have not filed for bankruptcy can never protect their 
EIC from execution by judgment creditors. 
The constitutionality of the Kansas statute was unsuccessfully challenged 
by the trustee in In re Westby. 80 In the course of the bankruptcy court's 
decision, Judge Karlin noted that the legislative history to the special exemp-
tion in bankruptcy for the EIC suggests that the exemption was adopted in 
order to enhance the ability of "low income Kansans ... to maintain and 
improve their lives." 81 She quotes the legislative sponsor of the new exemp-
tion as further stating: "Under current law, the debtor can be forced to forfeit 
76The history of, and the legislative intent behind, the confusing statutory scheme in California is 
recounted in some detail by in In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 81·82 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). 
77Code § 522(b)(l) was revised by § 306(a) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98·353, 98 Stat. 333, to provide that joint debtors may not elect to exempt both 
property described in § 522(d) and other property described in state or other non-bankruptcy exemption 
laws. 
78Kansas is an opt·out jurisdiction, KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60·2312 (1980), although the state opt·out 
was amended in 1986 to allow Kansas debtors to also claim as exempt the benefits described in Code 
§ 522(d)(l0). New York also allows its debtors to claim the general state exemptions, but then adds in 
bankruptcy the right to up to $4,000 in equity in a motor vehicle and various rights to receive payments 
(or property traceable to certain sources) such as, for example, social security and public assistance bene· 
fits, certain retirement plans, a crime victim's reparations law, or a wrongful death suit. N.Y. DEBT. & 
CRED. LAW §§ 282, 283 (2011). 
790ther states, including, Colorado, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, also exempt the EIC, but they do so as 
part of the general exemption scheme, not in a bankruptcy-only scenario. In other states, the EIC may be 
exempt as a form of "public assistance." 
80473 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012), affd, 486 B.R. 509 (B.A.P. lOth Cir. 2013). See also In re 
Earned Income Tax Credit Exemption Constitutional Challenge Cases, 477 B.R. 791 (Bank. D. Kan. 2012) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the statute), affd, Na2;ar v. Lea (In re Lea), 2013 WL 4431267 (D. Kan. 
2013). 
8
'Westby, 473 B.R. at 399. 
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the [refund of the EIC]. Such forfeiture is counterproductive and further 
inhibits the debtor's ability to recover, making it more likely that the debtor 
will come to require state services." 82 Notwithstanding those laudable (al-
beit somewhat self-interested) goals, Judge Karlin observed that there is no 
legislative history that explains why the exemption was given to debtors in 
bankruptcy, but not to general debtors in Kansas outside of bankruptcy, since 
the rationale for its passage would seem equally applicable in both 
circumstances.s3 
As observed, while the exemption schemas in California are expressly 
made mutually exclusive, bankruptcy debtors are permitted to elect to have 
their exemptions determined under one or the other,84 whether or not the 
same thing of a sort is true in Michigan is unclear. In Shapiro v. Sassa~,85 the 
trustee challenged the debtor's attempt to claim an exemption based on the 
state's general exemption statute in addition to the exemptions provided for 
in the state's list of bankruptcy-only exemptions. Specifically, the trustee 
maintained that MCL § 600.5451 is the applicable state law when, as was 
the case here, the debtor elects under § 522(b )(3) to have his exemptions 
determined by state law rather under than the federal Bankruptcy Code. 
The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and the trustee appealed 
to the district court. The district court's opinion initially observed that, in 
an unpublished ruling from the bench in an earlier case,86 another bankruptcy 
judge in the same district had sustained such a challenge by the trustee based 
on the plain wording of the perambulatory language in MCL § 600.545I.87 
In Shapiro, however, Judge Borman declined to follow that authority, noting 
instead that the available legislative history, together with the context in 
which MCL § 600.5451 was adopted, evinced an intention to "moderniz;e 
and expand" the exemptions available to debtors in bankruptcy, rather than 
82Id. 
83Id. The same lack of explanation as to why Michigan limited its new exemption scheme in 2005, see 
supra note 69, to debtors who had filed bankruptcy raises some suspicion that perhaps it represents yet 
another political compromise; one designed to subordinate debtor rights to the interests of powerful local 
creditors, while favoring debtors at the expense of large national creditors under the bankruptcy law. See 
Christopher W. Frost, Ban~ruptcy-Specific Exemptions: Authority, Uniformity, Preemption and Politics, 33 
(No.3) BANKR. L. LTR. 1, 9 (2013). See also infra note 291 In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626,632 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2006) ("[S]etting bankruptcy policies on the state level would enable states to favor in-state credi· 
tors over similarly-situated out·of·state creditors." (quoting Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. 
(In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 764·65 (6th Cir. 2003)), abrogated by Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 
689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013). 
84 See supra note 7 5 and accompanying text. 
85Shapiro V. Sassak (In re Sassak), 426 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
86In re Eisenberg, No. 05·56811, 2006 WL 7137735 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2006). 
81Sassa~, 426 B.R. at 688 (discussing the bases for the ruling in Eisenberg. including the view that if 
the legislature had intended to leave existing exemptions available to bankruptcy debtors it would have 
simply amended MCL § 600.6023(a) rather than enacted an entirely new chapter). 
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to limit them.88 The court also suggested that restricting the debtor to the 
bankruptcy-only exemptions would be to ignore the direction in § 522(b)(3) 
concerning the exemptions to which a debtor is entitled when the debtor 
elects (or is compelled) to claim her exemptions under state law.s9 The exclu-
sivity vel non of a comprehensive bankruptcy-specific set of exemptions has 
created a similar split of authority. in Georgia.90 As a result, further contrib-
uting to the disuniformity in the system produced by the opt-out, it seems 
that no two state approaches to bankruptcy-specific exemptions can safely be 
assumed to be alike in all particulars. · 
III. CHALLENGES TO BANKRUPTCY-SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS 
Judge Cole's opinion in In re Schafer91 .is representative of the weight of 
more recent authority, including the three other appellate court decisions92 
on the question of the constitutionality of. the various sorts of state bank-
ruptcy-specific exemptions. The undisputed facts of the case involved a 
Michigan debtor's election to have his exemptions determined under MCL 
§ 600.5451 and, as a consequence, enjoy a much larger homestead exemption 
than he would have enjoyed under either Bankruptcy Code § 522(d) or 
Michigan's general homestead exemption.93 The trustee objected to the 
claim as violative of both the Bankruptcy Clause and the Supremacy Clause 
88Id. at 694. 
89Id. at 691 (construing the Michigan statute consistently with the direction of§ 522(b)(3) entitling 
the debtor to receive all exemptions available u!lder State or local law). See also Sticka v. Applebaum (In re 
Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 690 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that the decision by Congress to refer 
to "State and' local law" in§ 522(b)(3)(A), rather than just "applicable non-bankruptcy law," as it did in 
§ 522(b)(3)(B) (dealing with entireties property) indicates an intent by Congress to empower the states 
to enact bankruptcy-only exemptions). But see id. at 696 (Markell, J., dissenting) (offering a "simpler, less 
strained explanation" for the uses of the different phrases). 
90Compare In re Fullwood 446 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010) (state statute making workers' com-
pensation claims and payments exempt applied even though the such exemption was not included in 
Georgia's statute, GA. CoDE. ANN.§ 44-13-100, listing bankruptcy-specific exemptions), with In re Allen, 
No. 10-50827, 2010 WL 3958171 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2010) (concluding that there is no indication 
that the Georgia legislature intended to supplement the bankruptcy-specific exemptions in GA. CoDE 
ANN.§ 44·13-100 with exemptions found in other Georgia statutes). See also In re Joyner, 489 B.R. 292 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012) (holding the bankruptcy-specific exemptions exclusive). The language in GA. CoDE 
ANN.§ 44-13·21 (providing that "(n]o person who is allowed the exemptions under Code Section 44-13-
100 shall take any benefit under this article; nor shall any person who is allowed the exemptions under this 
article be allowed the exemptions under Code Section 44·13·100") seems to support the view that the 
two schemes are mutually exclusive. 
91 Richardson v. Shafer (In re Shafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 
(2013). 
92Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2009) (involving a direct appeal based on West Vir-
ginia's bankruptcy-only scheme); Kulp v. Zeman (In re Kulp), 949 F.2d 1106, 1109 n.3 (lOth Cir. 1991) 
(discussed infra note 154); Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
See also supra notes 36-37. 
93See supra text accompanying notes 71·72. 
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of the Constitution. In a published decision,94 the bankruptcy court rejected 
the objection, relying heavily on the Sixth Circuit's decision in Rhodes v. 
Stewart,95 which had recognized the concurrent authority of the states under 
the Bankruptcy Code to promulgate laws governing exemptions in bank-
ruptcy cases.96 
On appeal to the circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (""BAP"), the state 
of Michigan intervened to support the debtor's position and the enforceabil-
ity of its statute. The alliance did the debtor very little good, as the BAP 
reversed the bankruptcy court, finding that: (1) Congress' authority to pass 
bankruptcy legislation is exclusive,97 and (2) MCL § 600.5451 contravened 
the Bankruptcy Clause's requirement of geographical uniformity by creating a 
disparity between exemptions available to Michigan debtors in and outside of 
bankruptcy.98 As for appellate authority from other jurisdictions reaching 
the opposite conclusion,99 the BAP observed that these decisions had failed 
to properly distinguish between the debtor's right to exempt property under 
state law, which is unarguable, from the state's right to enact legislation that 
applies only in bankruptcy; the latter representing an exercise of power that 
the BAP concluded was beyond the scope of authority conferred under the 
opt-out provision of the Code, and, in any case, would be unconstitutional. 100 
The State of Michigan then appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reinstated 
the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of the debtor. 
While it has been clear since the early nineteenth century that the states 
are free to enact bankruptcy laws in circumstances where Congress has not 
exercised its authority to enact uniform laws· on the subject of bankrupt-
94In re Jones, 428 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010). 
95Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1983). 
96Rhodes entailed a constitutional challenge to Tennessee's opt-out legislation on the basis that the 
Tennessee state exemptions were less beneficial than the exemptions to which the debtor would have 
been entitled under the Code but for the opt-out. Citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 
(1819) (discussed infra notes l39-141and accompanying text), the court first noted that it has long been 
established that the states and the federal government share concurrent authority to promulgate bank-
ruptcy laws. Rhodes, 705 F.2d at 163. The court continued, in somewhat contradictory fashion, that the 
preemption doctrine could not apply in this case because it involved an area of the law where Congress 
had "expressly and concurrently authorize[ d] the state legislatures to disregard or opt-out of [the federal 
exemption scheme]." Id. See also supra note 61 for additional citations to cases upholding§ 522(b) and 
the opt-out based on the doctrine of geographic uniformity adopted by the Supreme Court in Moyses. 
97Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 455 B.R. 590, 602 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011) (relying on circuit 
authority in Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir. 2003), 
affd, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), to the effect that the states had ceded their authority to legislate in the area of 
bankruptcy when the Constitution was enacted). 
98Id. at 605-06. Having held that the bankruptcy-specific statute violated the Bankruptcy Clause, the 
court concluded that it was unnecessary to address the Supremacy Clause challenge. Id. at 606-07. 
99See supra note 92. 
100Schafer, 455 B.R. at 604. 
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cies,101 a condition that existed during most of the nineteenth century, in 
Shafer the trustee argued that because Congress has adopted a federal bank-
ruptcy law, Michigan's bankruptcy-specific exemption statute violated Con-
gress' exclusive authority in the field. 102 The trustee, like the BAP, relied 
heavily on the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hood v. Tennessee Student Assis-
tance Corp.,103 wherein the court had grounded its decision sustaining Con-
gress' authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy cases on 
the fact that, when it does act, Congress's authority over the subject of bank-
ruptcies is exclusive.104 
In his opinion on behalf of the court, however, Judge Cole sought to har-
monize Hood with the court's earlier decision in Rhodes. The technique he 
employed was to focus on the language in Rhodes stating that when Congress 
expressly authorizes the states to act in bankruptcy matters, the states enjoy 
concurrent jurisdiction with Congress. 105 The court then observed that 
§ 522(b) constituted precisely such a ceding of joint authority, thereby con-
ferring on the states not just the authority to have state rather than federal 
law determine exemptions in bankruptcy, but also the power to act affirma-
tively with respect to exemptions in bankruptcy, unrelated to applicable 
state law governing exemption policy for all other purposes.106 
· Like the Sixth Circuit's BAP in the decision below, 107 other courts have 
not interpreted the opt-out authority in§ 522(b)(2), and the related incorpo-
101See infra text accompanying notes 139-140. See also supra note 7. 
102Richardson v. Shafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2012), cert denied. 133 S. Ct. 
1244 (2013). If, of course, the power is exclusive, then it is also nondelegable. See also infra text accompa-
nying note 175. 
103Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003), affd, 541 
u.s. 440 (2004). 
104/d. at 764·65 (justifying Congress's abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity pursuant to § 106 
of the Code). This interpretation is a variation of sorts on the dormant commerce clause analysis, but still 
quite consistent with its underlying analysis of the scope and impact of the powers conferred on Congress 
by Article 1 of the Constitution. The difference, but not one that offsets the similarities, is that the 
Commerce Clause represents a bar to state legislation even in the absence of congressional action, see 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), while the Bankruptcy Clause reserves exclusive power to Congress 
only when it has exercised the power, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
105Schafer, 689 F.3d at 606 ("Under those precedents, the states retain the power to act where the 
federal government has declined to do so (Hood) or where, as in the area of exemptions, it has decided to 
permit the states to act (Rhodes)."). Of course, this analysis begs the question of the extent to which 
Congress has authorized the states to act; the question that goes to the heart of the issue. See Sticka v. 
Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 696·97 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (Markell,]., dissenting) (care· 
fully examining the legislative history leading to enactment of the Code to conclude that the extent of 
Congress's delegation to the states was to allow them to choose whether or not their residents would have 
access to the § 522(d) exemptions). 
106Schafer, 689 F.3d at 607 (citing Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2009), for the 
proposition that Congress did not see fit to restrict the authority delegated to the states by requiring that 
state exemptions apply equally in bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy situations). 
107Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 455 B.R. 590, 606 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011) (observing that there 
is no authority for a state to differentiate among its own citizens). 
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ration of state law in §522(b)(3), so broadly.1°8 That is to say, to regard 
those provisions as permitting states effectively to pass exemption legislation 
not of general applicability within the state, but appertaining only in bank-
ruptcy cases filed by or against residents of that state. These courts view the 
states' opt-out authority as allowing states to avoid the federal bankruptcy 
exemptions in cases involving their domiciliaries, but not authorizing states to 
create others in their place.109 Similarly, they regard the choice conferred on 
debtors (subject to the opt-out) under § 522(b)(3) to have their exemptions 
determined under "State or local law," as falling considerably short of an affir-
mation of the states' discretion to enact state laws that apply only in bank-
ruptcy,uo and surely no other provision of the Code or the legislative history 
can fairly be read as ceding back to the states Congress's exclusive power to 
adopt bankruptcy legislation. 
With regard to the trustee's challenge to the Michigan statute based on 
the Bankruptcy Clause, the BAP found that the requirement of geographic 
uniformity, as established by the Court in Moyses, tu meant that a state law 
will be regarded as passing muster on the question of uniformity even though 
debtors in different states may be treated differently. 112 In this case, there-
fore, the BAP had concluded MCL § 600.5451 was infirm in that it pre-
cluded the bankruptcy trustee from reaching assets that would be available to 
a judgment creditor in the same state had bankruptcy not been filed. In other 
words, the lower court interpreted geographic uniformity as permitting varia-
tion from state to state, but mandating that within a state bankruptcy and 
non-bankruptcy judgment debtors and judgment creditors be treated alike.1 13 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit in Judge Cole's opinion rebuffed this inter-
pretation of uniformity within the Bankruptcy Clause, pointing out that 
Moyses did not speak to nor require consistency between the treatment of 
108E.g., In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the doctrine of geographic 
uniformity does not extend to treating debtors from the state differently depending on whether or not 
they have filed for bankruptcy); In re Reynolds, 24 B.R. 344, 347 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (state-enacted 
bankruptcy-only exemptions invade an area of law reserved by the Constitution to the federal 
government). 
109In reCross, 255 B.R. 25, 34 n.5 (Bankr. D. Ind. 2000). Cross is discussed in greater depth infra text 
accompanying notes 205·213. 
110See Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 695·96 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (Markell, 
]., dissenting) (explaining how§ 522's legislative history "leaves no room for doubt that Congress intended 
to retain states' existing exemption-framing rights, rather than expand them."). Cf In re Sullivan, 680 F .2d 
1131, 1137 (7th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that the states' authority to establish exemptions in bankruptcy is 
permitted only "so long as the state law does not conflict with the federal bankruptcy laws."). 
"'Hanover Nat'! Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). 
112Schafer, 455 B.R. at 596. 
113Id. at 596·97 (relying on Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190, and the Supreme Court's later decision in lnt'l 
Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929), striking an Arkansas statute that provided an alternative 
state law system governing distribution of the debtor's property and discharge from debts). 
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debtors and creditors in and outside of bankruptcy.114 Citing from its earlier 
decision in Schultz v. United States, 115 involving the unsuccessful attempt to 
have BAPCPA's means test declared unconstitutional, the court concluded 
that geographic uniformity, as established by the Supreme Court in Moyses, 
": . . allows different effects in various states due to dissimilarities in state law, 
so long as federal law applies uniformly among classes of debtors.~ 116 From 
this, Judge Cole reasoned that, properly understood, uniformity focuses on 
the process by which debtors and creditors in the same place are treated, and 
not necessarily whether the outcomes in and outside of bankruptcy are 
identical.U 7 
Turning to the trustee's Supremacy Clause challenge, Judge Cole ex-
pressed the court's concurrence with the analysis in cases from both the 
Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit BAP addressing the issue. 118 Specifi-
cally, of the three ways in which a state law may be preempted,119 the parties 
had conceded that the first, "express preemption,~ was not an option in the 
circumstances.120 While of the view that the second form of preemption, 
field preemption, 121 was likely inapplicable in relation to federal bankruptcy 
law as a whole, the court noted that it need not resolve that issue inasmuch 
as its earlier decision in Rhodes had established that Congress's delegation to 
the states of an explicit role in the area of bankruptcy exemptions negated the 
applicability of this form of preemption.122 The final question, then, for the 
114 Schafer, 689 F.3d at 610. See also infra text accompany. notes 161·179 for further discussion. 
115529 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1071 (2008). 
ll6Jd. 
117Schafer, 689 F.3d. at 611·12 (~Schultz clarified that it is not the outcome that determines the uni· 
formity, but the uniform process by which creditors and debtors in a certain place are treated."). Of 
course, the challenge to the means test, based on the. fact that it calls for calculations determined, in part, 
on state and county law, attacked Congress's decision to incorporate existing state law. As discussed infra 
note 188 and text accompanying notes 155·156, 213·216 and 290 that is quite different from Congress 
effectively acknowledging or acquiescing in the state's ability to pass ~bankruptcy laws"; laws that only 
obtain in bankruptcy cases and have no significance except in that context. That is to say, the issue in 
Schultz was much more like the issue in Rhodes v. Stewart, challenging the use of state exemptions (a long 
settled matter) than it was like the issue in Schafer-entailing affirmative state legislation in bankruptcy 
cases. 
118Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2009); Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 
684 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
119See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 227·29 (2000) (describing the different 
forms of express and implied preemption that have been recognized by the Supreme Court). 
120Schafer, 689 F.3d at 614. Express preemption applies when Congress, acting within its proper 
authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. Nat'! Solid Wastes 
Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
121 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2492,2500 (2012) (observing ~(t]he intent to 
displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation 'so pervasive ... that Con· 
gress left no room for the States to supplement it' or where there is a 'federal interest ... so dominant that 
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'"). 
122Schafer, 689 F.3d at 614 (quoting Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 163 (1983) to the effect that 
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court was whether MCL § 600.5451 was assailable under a ~conflict pre-
emption" analysis, which pertains either when it would be impossible to com-
ply simultaneously with both the state and federal laws, or compliance with 
the state law would hinder or frustrate accomplishment in full of the pur-
poses underlying the federal law. 123 Judge Cole rejected the trustee's argu-
ment in this regard, noting the seeming absence of conflict, or at most the 
type of conflict, between MCL § 600.541 and federal law that would be 
sufficient to trigger preemption.l24 To the contrary, the court observed that, 
as-applied, the Michigan statute actually furthers, rather than frustrates, fed-
eral bankruptcy policy since it provides for a more favorable homestead ex-
emption, consistent with the aim in Chapter 7 of enhancing the debtor's fresh 
start. 125 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
A. THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF 
UNIFORMITY 
The origins of the Bankruptcy Clause are obscure. In his classic work, 
Ban~ruptcy in United States History, Charles Warren pointed out that the 
Bankruptcy Clause was not considered by the Federal Convention of 1787 
until quite late in the proceedings. 126 It was then adopted with little discus-
sion or debate_127 Nonetheless, a rather clear understanding of the motiva-
tions animating the Framers' decision to include the Bankruptcy Clause in 
~congress expressly authorize[ d] the states to 'preempt' the federal legislation· with regard to exemp· 
tions). But see authorities cited infra note 196. 
123See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) ("[A]ny state legislation which frustrates the full 
effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause."). Perez involved the attempted 
withdrawal under an Arizona statute of the debtors' driver's licenses after they had discharged in bank-
ruptcy the costs associated with an earlier traffic accident. I d. at 638-44. The majority opinion concluded 
that the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act interfered with the purposes of the discharge 
as set forth in § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Id. at 656. 
124Schafer, 689 F. 3d at 615 (citing Applebaum, 422 B.R. at 691) (stating that the mere fact that the 
state-designed bankruptcy exemptions differ from the federal exemptions does not mean that such differ-
ences necessarily impede accomplishment of the goals of the federal system). 
125Id at 616. Accord In re Morrell, 394 B.R. 405 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2008); In re Brown, No. 06-
30199, 2007 WL 2120380 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007). But see Applebaum, 422 B.R. at 697 (Mar-
kell,]., dissenting) (questioning the "wisdom of relegating the validity of state-enacted bankruptcy-only 
exemptions to a case-by-case analysis without enunciating any test or guiding principles."); infra text ac-
companying notes 193-196. The Schafer opinion also distinguished away the Ninth Circuit's decision 
holding a California statute, purporting to remove property from the bankruptcy estate, unconstitutional 
under the Supremacy Clause, even though the Michigan statute arguably does precisely the same thing. 
689 F.3d at 613 n.6 (discussing Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974). See 
also infra note 189. 
126WARREN, supra note 6, at 4-5 (relating that the clause was an addition to Charles Pickney's motion 
to commit the report on the Full Faith and Credit Clause to the Convention). 
127Koffler, supra note 55, at 36 (recounting the very limited discussion that occurred at least in the 
extant records of the Federal Convention.). 
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Article I can be gleaned from ·the Federalist Papers (No. 42), wherein 
Madison wrote, "The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so 
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so 
many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into 
different States that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into 
question." 128 There is some thought that by use of the word "bankruptcy" 
rather than "'insolvency," the Framers had in mind the English system of 
bankruptcy as extant at the time,129 which was purely a creditors' remedy 
with its application limited to merchants and other traders, 130 but, as Profes-
sor Warren observed, "'whatever may have been the anticipation of the Fram-
ers at the time, the fact is the Bankruptcy Power has developed steadily, from 
being a regulation of traders for purely commercial purposes, into a National 
policy of relief, for creditors and debtors of all classes and for the restoration 
of business .... "131 
While the precise reasons for inclusion of the Bankruptcy Clause, and 
two other "'uniform" provisions, 132 in Article I may be cloudy, there can be 
128THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 278 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Hamilton also urged 
that the constitutional requirement of uniformity was necessary to prevent each state from prescribing a 
different rule. THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton). Indeed, prior to the American Revolution, 
there was a dizzying array of colonial laws. See generally CoLEMAN, supra note 5, at 12·13. Exacerbating 
the situation were the financial strains being experienced in the nation due to obligations incurred during 
the Revolution and some questionable speculation during the period of the Articles of Confederation. See 
BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 175·76 (2002) (discussing the economic situation prevailing in 
the 1780s). 
129Rhett Frimet, 'The Birth of Ban~ruptcy in the United States, 96 CoM. L.J. 160, 163-65 (1991) 
(discussing the English concept of bankruptcy during the Colonial Period at the time). One of the defini· 
tive sources on the subject is Professor Levinthal's account of English bankruptcy law. Levinthal, supra 
note 2. 
D 0Historically, the scope of a bankruptcy law, at least during the period in which the Constitution 
was written, was to distribute the assets of a debtor among his creditors, and to discharge him from the 
liability of having his future acquisitions attached at the instance of his creditors for the unsatisfied portion 
of his debts. An insolvency law, on the other hand, operated upon the petition of the debtor to liberate his 
person from prison in which he had been confined by the process of State laws for the collection of debts. 
F. REGIS NOEL, HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAw 124 (1919). For a summary of early English Bank-
ruptcy Law, see generally Countryman, supra note 50, at 226-27; McCoid, supra note 2; Tabb, supra note 
5, at 6-12; Charles]. Tabb, 'The Historical Evolution of the Ban~ruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 
( 1991) (observing how late an arriving phenomenon the discharge is in the broad sweep of English and 
American bankruptcy law). Professor Warren has observed, however, that the line of demarcation be· 
tween the two (bankruptcy and insolvency laws) was never as sharp in the Colonies as it was in England, 
although he speculates that the Framers likely conceived that exercise of the power would primarily be for 
the benefit of the commercial classes. See WARREN, supra note 6, at 7. 
D 1Jd. at 8. See also Koffler, supra note 55, at 42 (suggesting that by the time of the very first U.S. 
bankruptcy law, the focus was on the power of the central government to defeat "the parochial, anticom-
mercial policies of the agrarian states .... ," and safeguarding over local interests the nation's interest in 
establishing and maintaining a single market for the extension of credit). 
D 2The power of Congress to establish "an uniform Rule of Naturalization" is contained in the same 
clause of the Constitution as the federal bankruptcy power. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. Likewise, the 
power conferred on Congress in Article 1 to impose taxes, duties and excises was qualified by the require-
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little doubt that concern and dissatisfaction over the diz.z.ying array of state 
laws that existed during colonial times and under the Articles of Confedera-
tion were unquestionably major considerations in the minds of the Fram-
ers, 133 compounded in all likelihood by the precarious condition of the 
nation's financial health in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War. 134 
Surely the decision to make explicit in the Constitution the power of Con-
gress to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies was grounded in 
significant measure on the dissatisfaction with the fractionaliz.ed system of 
state-only regulation of debtor/creditor relationships that preceded ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, 135 and continued even afterwards through the 
1790s.136 It also seems clear that, from the early days of the Republic, the 
Bankruptcy Clause was understood to confer broad powers on Congress not 
only to promulgate laws on the subject of bankruptcy, but also to determine 
the scope of the states' authority over what sorts of laws constituted a "bank-
ruptcy act." 137 Whatever else might be said in relation to the more limited 
meaning given to the term "bankruptcies" in 1787, it is beyond cavil that the 
Framers recogniz.ed that, if not permanently then at least from time-to-time, 
there would need to be a consistent national response to the issues associated 
ment that any such taxes, duties, and excises would be uniform. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, cl 1. It has been 
surmised that, at the time, "uniformity~ reflected not only a transcending national interest in the subject, 
but also a concern over the prospect that the federal government might discriminate to favor one state or 
region over another. See Koffler, supra note 55, at 37·38. 
msee MANN, supra note 128, at 80, 179 (reviewing the array of different colonial laws, and the fact 
that, at least in some states, like New York, they changed "with breathtaking frequency .... ~). See also 
Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Ban~ruptcy Clause, 1 AM.]. LEGAL HIST. 215, 220·27 (1957) 
(describing the situation in the colonies and as of the opening of the Constitutional Convention in 1787); 
supra note 128. 
134See MANN, supra note 128, at 176. See also Countryman, supra note 50, at 228 (discussing financial 
crises at the time). Of course, as Professor Lipson has pointed out, while the confusing, confounding, and 
fractionalized contemporary state of affairs may explain why the Framers wanted to create a nationwide 
law on financial distress, they do not necessarily explain why the Bankruptcy Clause took the form it did. 
See Lipson, supra note 5, at 627 (seeking to advance a constitutional theory of bankruptcy based on the 
notion of "exceptionalism"). 
135See In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006) (citing Cent. Virginia Cmty. Call. 
v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 367·68 (2006) (discussing the backdrop against which the Bankruptcy Clause was 
adopted)) (noting that the Framers were intent on replacing the hodgepodge of disparate state bankruptcy 
relief with a single national law that would apply uniformly among all states). See also Koffler, supra note 
55, at 39·40, 72·73 (discussing the use of the uniformity requirement where it appears in the Constitution 
as a means of overriding sectional interests in an effort to develop a coherent national policy). 
136Several efforts were made to pass a federal bankruptcy bill in the early years of the new Republic, 
but all fell prey to sectarian opposition. See generally Thomas Plank, Why Ban~ruptcy judges Need Not 
and Should Not be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 607·08 (1998). See also Randolph J. 
Haines, Getting to Abrogation, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 458 (2002) (noting that Thomas Jefferson, a quite 
prominent debtor, in particular opposed such laws based on his expressed concern that they would be pro· 
merchant and anti-agrarian in orientation, posing the threat of forc'ed sales of bankrupts' lands). 
137Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 128·29 (1819) (rejecting the older, technical 
distinction between insolvency and bankruptcy laws). See also supra note 7. 
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with financial failures and distress in order to maintain public confidence and 
avoid precipitating an undesirable ~race to the bottom" that might well result 
from reliance on nonuniform state law. 138 
The Bankruptcy Clause is curious in, and notable for, the fact that the 
power delegated to Congress by the states is, of course, the power to enact 
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. In 1819, Chief Justice Marshall 
addressed the question of whether this reference meant that the laws of 
bankruptcy were intended to be uniform throughout the country, in which 
case authority to legislate in the field would need exclusively to be with 
Congress, or whether the Framers had in mind that Congress would act 
when it deemed it necessary, to establish a uniform system that would pre-
empt inconsistent state law, but that otherwise the states could legislate dur-
ing periods of dormancy. The Chief Justice concluded that the later 
interpretation was proper, such that it was only the authority to pass uni-
form laws in the field that the states ceded to Congress when the Constitu-
tion was ratified, and not exclusive authority in the field.~ 39 In the absence of 
a federal bankruptcy law, then, Chief Justice Marshall held that the states 
138That is to say, bankruptcy law cannot be both uniform and at the same time subject to the legisla-
tion of multiple sovereigns. Thus, to the degree that bankruptcy must be uniform, the power to legislate 
in that area must be exclusively federal. Chief Justice Marshall echoed this theme in his opinion in Ogden 
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827), a case declaring a New York insolvency law that 
purported to discharge debtors unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause, U.S. CaNST .. art. I,§ 10, cl. 1 
(prohibiting the states from impairing the obligation of COJ)tracts). In describing the economic environ-
ment in which the Constitutional Convention took place, the Chief Justice stated: 
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor ... had been 
used to such an excess by the State legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary 
intercourse of society, and destr~y all confidence between man and man. The mis-
chief had become so great, so alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, 
and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and de-
stroy the sanctity of private faith. 
Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 354-55. While obviously writing sometime after the Convention, Justice 
Story's Commentaries provide strong support for this view of the Framer's intent. See III JusTICE STORY 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION § 1102, at 7 (De Capo Press ed. 1970) (1st ed. 1833) 
("[D]iversities of almost infinite variety and object may be introduced into the local system, which may 
work gross injustice and inequality, and nourish feuds and discontents in neighboring states."). 
139Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 196 (1819) ("It is not the right to establish these 
uniform laws [on the subject of Bankruptcies], but their actual establishment, which is inconsistent with 
the partial acts of the states."). At the same time, however, the Chief Justice, who was not unfamiliar 
with the circumstances surrounding the Convention, noted that it was the dissatisfaction of the merchant 
classes in the years after the Revolutionary War with the with the helter-skelter approach of the various 
states, and the threat to economic security of the Union that they created, that prompted the Framers to 
preempt state legislation governing the subject, and to bar the states from interfering with the sanctity of 
contract. Jd. at 205. See also III STORY, supra note 138, §§ 1102, 1104, at 6-7, 9. (observing that the 
justification for the grant of exclusivity was not a mere desire to have one system, but a fear that each state 
would frame a bankruptcy system that "best suits its own local interests, and pursuits" or that was marked 
"by undue domestic preferences and favours."); Randolph ]. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Ban~­
ruptcy is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 170 (explaining that the Chief Justice regarded the grant of 
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could pass insolvency legislation, so long as these laws did not violate the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution.140 The Court did not again speak to 
the meaning of the "uniform" qualification in the Bankruptcy Clause until the 
Moyses decision, and its curious determination that the reference was to be 
understood as relating to geographic and not personal uniformity. 141 
As noted earlier, Moyses involved a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 on the ground that the Act's incorporation of 
state law exemptions caused it to fail the Article I requirement that federal 
bankruptcy laws be "uniform." In explicating its holding, the Court stated 
that § 6 of' the 1898 Act, incorporating state exemptions, was uniform 
throughout the United States in the constitutional sense of the term because 
under its provisions the trustee in each state would have access to the same 
property that would have been available to an executing judgment creditor 
had bankruptcy not ensued.14 2 This statement played an important role in 
the trustee's argument in Schafer, as further discussed below.143 The Court 
in Moyses also rejected the argument that the recognition of state laws in 
bankruptcy constituted an unlawful delegation by Congress of the legislative 
power conferred on it by the Constitution on the subject of bankruptcies. 144 
It is important to note, however, that the Court's holding did not extend to 
the proposition that, under the geographic uniformity test, Congress might 
incorporate into the federal system a state law that does not apply uniformly 
to all the citizens of that state, such as legislation only affecting those citizens 
power in the Bankruptcy Clause to be not a limitation, but the grant of more extensive power, in 
Congress). 
140ln this case, the New York law at issue, which provided debtors who surrendered all of their 
property with a discharge, was found infirm as violating the constitutional interdiction of state laws that 
impair the obligation of contracts. Sturges, 17 U.S. ( 4 Wheat.) at 204. 
141Hanover Nat'! Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). 
142/d. at 188. It has been contended ,_,:,ith some force that the construction of uniformity adopted in 
Moyses strayed considerably from the intent of the Framers t·o have a national bankruptcy law that would 
stand above the partial, clashing undertakings of the states. See Austin, supra note 61, at 1162·64; Coun· 
tryman, supra note 12, at 681;.Koffler, supra note 55, at 62. That point aside, however, it is important to 
recogni~;e, as will be discussed in greater detail below, that the holding in Moyses, that Congress may to an 
extent defer to state legislation within an otherwise comprehensive scheme of bankruptcy regulation, does 
not support the view that Congress may also grant the states authority to promulgate bankruptcy legisla· 
tion-laws that apply only in bankruptcy. See infra text accompanying notes 174, 223·224. 
143See infra text accompanying notes 160·178. · 
144Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190 (relying on Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 561·62 (1891) (sustaining 
the validity of a congressional act leaving to the ~tates the determination of some fact or state of things, 
upon which the action of the "federal law may apply)). Thus, the court in Moyses, apparently regarded 
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as simply allowing the states to specify the fact or condition of 
what property the bankruptcy law could operate upon. However, the Court in Rahrer also observed the 
basic proposition in relation to Congress's Article I powers; namely, that "congress can neither delegate its 
own powers nor, enlarge those of a State,~ Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 560, which, it will be iJ.rgued, is precisely 
the result of recogni~;ing the validity, if not of general state exemptions, certainly of bankruptcy·only 
exemptions. See also infra note 175. 
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who file for bankruptcy. 145 Indeed, the practice was practically unknown 
until after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.146 
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in relation to the Bankruptcy Clause, 
while hardly robust,147leaves no doubt that the states retain the authority to 
pass bankruptcy enactments so long as the federal government has declined to 
so; that is, when the federal bankruptcy power is dormant, provided that the 
state law does not impair the obligation of contracts. 148 That situation, of 
course has not' existed since prior to 1898. In addition, Moyses makes clear 
that state law may operate in bankruptcy, and frequently does, when Con-
gress determines to delegate certain matters to the states, as it has done since 
1898 with the exemption-determining provisions of the Code.149 
145Likewise, the case frequently cited along with Moyses, Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918) 
(holding that the 1898 Act's application of state fraudulent conveyance law did not violate the Bank· 
ruptcy Clause) sanctioned Congress's recognition of state law in certain particulars, it did not recognize or 
approve of a state's authority to enact fraudulent transfer laws that would apply only in bankruptcy cases 
filed by residents of that state. Indeed, the Court expressly noted in Stellwagen that state laws that 
conflict with federal bankruptcy law are "suspended." Id. at 610. This distinction has not been lost to at 
least some courts under the Code. See, e.g., In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (conclud· 
ing that bankruptcy-specific exemptions treat debtors who have filed for bankruptcy differently from 
debtors who have not and, when measured by the "geographic uniformity test [estab lished in Moyses], 
the exemption scheme ... must fail."). 
146Cf Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974) (invalidating a California 
exemption statute effective only as against the trustee in bankruptcy). The court in Richardson v. Schafer 
(In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601, 613 n.6 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013), sought to 
differentiate Kanter as entailing an attempt by the state to define "property of the estate," rather than 
truly as an exemption case. See infra note 189. 
147The Moyses construct of geographic uniformity has been followed in other Supreme Court deci· 
sions. See, e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172·73 (1946), reh'g 
dEnied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947) (Frankfurter,]., concurring) ("The Constitution did not intend that transac· 
tions that have different legal consequences because they took place in different States shall come out with 
the same result because they passed through a bankruptcy court."). In only two cases has the Bankruptcy 
Clause been invoked to invalidate a statute: in one case a federal law and in the other instance a state law. 
In Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 448 U.S. 1301 (1980), the Rock Island Railroad Transition 
and Employer Assistance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1005 (1980), was held to be a bankruptcy statute subject to 
examination under the Bankruptcy Clause, and not under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, 
cl. 3; the latter, of course, having no requirement of uniformity. Because this Act was directed effectively 
toward one railroad, in contrast to Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corps., 419 U.S. 102 
(1974) (where the Act in question applied to all reorganizing railroads within a region), the Court found 
that enactment of private legislation of this sort violated the Bankruptcy Clause. In International Shoe Co. 
v. Pin~us, 278 U.S. 261 (1929), the Court invalidated an Arkansas statute that provided an alternative 
system to the federal bankruptcy law for distribution of the debtor's assets and discharge. The Court 
observed, "[ s ]tates may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act 
.... " Id. at 266. 
148See supra text accompanying note 140. 
149-fhe opt·out clause in Code § 522(b), which of course exceeds the Bankruptcy Act's incorporation 
of state exemptions, has been determined to be a constitutionally permissible exercise of congressional 
power. See authorities cited supra note 61. It is, however, important not to lose sight of the fact that the 
opt·out pertains only to § 522(d); which is to say that the states cannot override other aspects of bank· 
ruptcy exemption policy. See infra notes 220·224 and accompanying text. 
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What the high Court's jurisprudence has not yet answered, however, or 
at least not directly,150 is whether this delegation may exceed the incorpora-
tion of general state law into the federal scheme, or application of federal law 
to an existing structure of state-created rights and obligations. In other 
words, what has not been addressed is whether the state's so-called concur-
rent power to act in bankruptcy extends to the exercise of a power-enact-
ment of a bankruptcy law151-not prohibited to the states under the 
Constitution, but also not otherwise possessed by the states when Congress 
has exercised its preeminent authority in bankruptcy; and a power the very 
existence of which would seem to clash directly with the concerns that most 
likely prompted the Framers to grant the federal government control over the 
nation's bankruptcy laws in the first place.152 
In the first court of appeals case under the Code to address the issue of 
whether a state exemption statute that applies only in the case of bankruptcy 
violates the uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause, as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court in Moyses, the Tenth Circuit held that no such in-
fringement existed.153 In its cursory discussion in support of this holding, the 
court offered that no conflict with the federal scheme existed because 
§ 522(b) "expressly delegates to states the power to create bankruptcy ex-
emptions."154 In point of fact, however, the accuracy of this conclusion is 
open to serious debate. Certainly there is nothing in the language or legisla-
tive history of either §§ 522(b)(2) or (b)(3) that suggests Congress intended 
for the states to possess the power to create new exemptions that would 
apply only in bankruptcy cases filed by their residents. Rather, the states are 
given authority under § 522(b)(2) to deny their residents the opportunity to 
claim the § 522(d) exemptions. Likewise, § 522(b)(3) incorporates "State or 
local law applicable on the date of filing" upon the debtor's election to choose 
150The Court has, however, left little doubt that "[ t ]he fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine 
is that the lawmaking function belongs to Congress, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1, and may not be conveyed to 
another branch or entity." Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (citing Marshall Field & 
Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
151State·enacted, bankruptcy-specific exemptions are nothing less than that: bankruptcy laws, and it is 
contended that delegation of such authority, as distinct from either incorporation of state law in the 
federal system or allowing the states to limit their residents to the state's general exemptions, exceeds the 
scope of the state's "concurrent jurisdiction" to promulgate bankruptcy laws that the Sixth Circuit origi· 
nally discussed in Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1983). 
IS2See supra notes 128, 133·134 and accompanying text. 
153Kulp v. Zeman (In re Kulp), 949 F.2d 1106 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
154/d. at 1109 n.3. It is important to note that the principal challenge in this case, which involved a 
state law exempting certain retirement accounts in bankruptcy, was predicated on whether the statute as 
properly interpreted applied to the corpus of the account or just the accumulated interest. Therefore, the 
bulk of the opinion addresses that issue of interpretation. The argument based on the Bankruptcy Clause 
was raised in the alternative and the court's discussion is limited to a short footnote with very little 
analysis. Moreover, the court did not address the Supremacy Clause question at all. 
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her state exemptions, and of course in opt-out situations, but says nothing 
about the state's ability to adopt bankruptcy exemptions separate and apart 
from the state's general exemption laws. 155 Moreover, as noted, conferring 
on the states the power to determine affirmatively the property subject to 
administration in a bankruptcy case, as opposed to simply incorporating the 
law of the state applicable for other purposes, amounts to delegation of Con-
gress's Article I powers in a manner that exceeds the delegation of authority 
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Moyses. 156 The question then becomes 
whether or not such a delegation is lawful, and on that issue the Tenth Cir-
cuit was silent. 
By contrast, the BAP's opinion in Schafer tackles the question head-on, 
leaving no doubt in its estimation that such a delegation would be constitu-
tionally suspect.157 Moreover, in construing the uniformity requirement, the 
court opined that, while a debtor's rights may vary from one state to another 
without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Clause, the states have no authority 
to differentiate among their own citizens by creating either property rights or 
property exemptions applicable only to those citizens who file for bank; 
ruptcy. 158 In concluding that MCL § 600.5451 violates the uniformity pre-
script of the Bankruptcy Clause,159 the court focused specifically on the 
statement in Moyses that a statute is uniform "when the trustee takes in each 
state whatever would have been available to the creditor if the bankrupt[ cy] 
law had not been passed." l6o 
On appeal,l 61 the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the BAP's analysis must fail 
for three reasons. First, Judge Cole, in his opinion for the court, found that 
the portion of the Moyses decision that the BAP and the trustee had relied 
upon to strike MCL § 600.54151 as unconstitutional related to whether 
155Putting aside momentarily the lawfulness of such action, it is has been pointed out that approval of 
state-created bankruptcy exemptions is not necessarily found either in the language or legislative history of 
the Code. See supra note 110. 
156See supra notes 144·146 and accompanying text. 
157Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 455 B.R. 590, 601 (BA.P. 6th Cir. 2011) ("The Bankruptcy 
Clause exists to restrict the power of the states to legislate in the area of bankruptcy."). 
158ld. at 603 (reasoning that while a debtor"s rights in one state may vary from the rights of a debtor in 
a different state, there is no authority for a state to differentiate among its own citizens by creating 
separate property rights or a separate exemption scheme for only those citizens who file for bankruptcy). 
The BAP also observed that the Supreme Court's admonition in Butner v. United States. 440 U.S. 48 
(1979), that bankruptcy courts should look to state law to determine property interests in the assets of a 
bankruptcy estate, did not mean that the states had authority to pass legislation that did not apply to all 
residents, but only those in bankruptcy. Schafer, 455 B.R. at 605. 
159ld. at 606 ("A state statute which expressly differentiates between the rights available to a judg· 
ment creditor and those available to a bankruptcy trustee, violates the uniformity requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Clause."). 
160ld. (citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902)). 
161 Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied. 133 S. Ct. 1244 · 
(2013). 
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Congress could constitutionally defer to the several states nonuniform ex-
emption schemas in bankruptcy cases, and not whether bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy debtors must be treated alike. 162 This first rejoinder is question-
able on a couple of levels. Initially, the language of the decision in Moyses 
cited by the BAP represented the holding in the case. It is true that the 
specific issue before the Court was the validity of the incorporation of state 
exemptions, but the Moyses' Court's statement upon which the BAP relied 
relates to the meaning of the term ~uniform" in the Bankruptcy Clause, and 
the application of that explication of ~uniform" is in no way limited to a 
particular context. 163 In addition, just prior to setting forth its holding, the 
Court in Moyses cited approvingly from an earlier circuit court decision, In re 
Dec~ert, 164 challenging the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867s' 
inclusion of state law e~emptions in bankruptcy cases. 165 In that opinion, 
Chief Justice Waite, writing for the court, observed: ~This is not unjust, as 
every debt is contracted with reference to the rights of the parties thereto 
under existing exemption laws, and no creditor can reasonably complain if he 
gets his full share of all that the law, for the time being, places at the disposal 
of creditors."166 The implication being that if the property available for cred-
itors is less in bankruptcy than the property liable for judgment execution 
outside of bankruptcy, then there might indeed be an issue based on the con-
stitutional requirement of uniformity. Finally, the gravamen of the BAP's 
holding in Schafer was not that debtors and non-debtors ~must be treated 
alike," but rather that uniformity demands that a bankruptcy trustee in the 
case of a debtor from State X must be treated, for purposes of the property 
available for administration, the same as other creditors of such debtor would 
be treated in terms of the property available for judgment execution in State 
X. 
The second reason offered in Schafer for rejecting the BAP's interpreta-
tion of the holding Moyses was that that the Moyses Court ultimately con-
cluded that its concept of geographical uniformity requires only that the 
federal law apply uniformly among classes of debtors and, thus, allows for 
162/d. at 610. 
163See Moyses, 186 U.S. at 190 (the Court's focus was on when the system is uniform in a constitu-
tional sense). 
1647 F. Cas. 334 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874) (No. 3,728) (concurring with In re Beckerford, 3 F. Cas. 26 
(C.C.D. Mo. 1870) (No. 1,209)). Both decisions have been sharply criticized in terms of the paucity of the 
constitutional analysis. E.g., Countryman, supra note 12, at 681; Koffler, supra note 55, at 70-71 (sug-
gesting that the Dec~ert court erroneously read the term "uniform" to prohibit Congress (as opposed to the 
states) from impairing contracts, and noting the irony that Moyses should relied on a case that was so 
clearly wrong). 
165 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
166Dec~ert, 7 F. Cas. at 336. 
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differing effects in various states due to differences in state law. 167 So con-
ceived, the court held that MCL § 600.5451 applies no less uniformly among 
classes of debtors than did the exemption scheme upheld by the Court in 
Moyses. The Sixth Circuit's point seems to be that because § 522(b) of the 
Code, operating in tandem with MCL § 600.5451, treats all Michigan debt-
ors who opt to have their exemptions determined under § 526(b)(3) identi-
cally insofar as the determination of their exempt property is concerned, 
there can be no constitutional infirmity. 168 
The difficulty with this analysis is, firstly, that the trustee is not being 
treated the same as judgment creditors insofar as property available for ad-
ministration is concerned, a requirement that seems clearly to be the essence 
of the holding in Moyses. Secondly, the fact that Michigan debtors, as a class, 
are treated the same misses the point insofar as the requirement of uniformity 
in relation to bankruptcy law is concerned. In Butner v. United States,169 
while recognizing the applicability of state law in defining property interests, 
the Court emphasized the importance of the uniformity provision in the 
Bankruptcy Clause, observing that it promotes certainty, discourages forum-
shopping, and prevents the occurrence of disparate results based merely on 
the fact of bankruptcy.17° Those values are not undermined necessarily by 
Congress's decision to incorporate the several states' general exemption laws, 
even if the definition of exempt property will vary depending on which 
state's exemptions control. But when state legislatures are allowed to, and in 
fact do, decide that bankruptcy debtors from the state will receive different 
treatment than judgment debtors from that same state who have elected not 
to file bankruptcy, then the values underlying uniformity, as articulated by 
the Court in Butner, are in jeopardy, if not actually already compromised. 
Further, the fact that the constitutional requirement of uniformity is "ge-
ographic," does not mean that bankruptcy law is uniform simply because it 
"uniformly" incorporates the laws enacted by each state. Such an interpreta-
tion denudes the term "uniformity" of any meaning.m The Framers intendecl 
167Schafer, 689 F.3d at 610 (citing in support of this proposition the Court's earlier decision in Schultz 
v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 2008), involving an unsuccessful challenge to BAPCPA 
based on the uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause). 
168Presumably, the point also hinges on the assumption that the requirement of uniformity is a limita· 
tion on the exercise of federal power only and, therefore, does not apply to the states. See In re Brown, 
No. 06-30199, 2007 WL 2120380, at *7 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007). Some courts reject that proposition. 
E.g., In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). More to the point, however, it assumes that the 
states retain the power to promulgate bankruptcy legislation when Congress has exercised its power to 
establish uniform laws concerning bankruptcies. This proposition is a dubious one. See supra text accom-
panying notes 153-156. 
169440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
'
70Id at 55. 
171Surely, such an argument, carried to its logical extreme, would produce results ·that no reasonable 
person would seriously abide. For instance, applying the argument to preference law, one could by the 
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that Congress possess the ability when necessary to effectuate commercial 
policy at the national level in order to overcome the evils associated with a 
multiplicity of discordant state laws.172 Congress cannot, therefore, properly 
delegate to the several states the ability to define key features and outcomes 
in a federal bankruptcy case because the individual states, by definition, do 
not and cannot affect national policy. Thus, while Congress may constitu-
tionally choose to incorporate aspects of state law into a bankruptcy case, the 
federal bankruptcy law cannot be considered as operating in a uniform fash-
ion, as constitutionally mandated, when the states are permitted to legislate 
directly in the federal bankruptcy arena. But that is precisely the effect of 
state-enacted bankruptcy-specific exemptions; i.e., to legislate bankruptcy 
outcomes, and control the distribution of assets in bankruptcy between debt-
ors and their creditors, not just by means of incorporation of existing state 
law, but particularly and without regard to any general state purpose. 
The response to this second reason implicates the third explanation of-
fered by Judge Cole in Schafer for rejecting the BAP's analysis on the ques-
tion of uniformity. Specifically, the opinion notes that the holding in Moyses, 
if literally applied, would call into question the current scheme in § 522 of 
the Code in situations where: (1) the state has not opted-out, (2) the debtor 
elects to have her exemptions determined under § 522(d), and (3) the 
§ 522(d) exemptions exceed the amount of the otherwise applicable state ex-
emptions.173 This is true, and it is one of several reasons why it is submitted 
that the incorporation of state exemptions, whether on a mandatory or per-
missive basis, should be eliminated regardless of whether or not a decision 
(even assuming such a decision was actually made by Congress) to delegate 
authority to enact bankruptcy-only exemptions is lawfuJ.l74 
Insofar as the constitutional requirement of uniformity is concerned, how-
ever, there is an important difference in the two situations. The election in 
§ 522(b)(3) initially gives every debtor in the nation the same choice; be-
tween applicable state or federal bankruptcy exemptions, and the debtor will 
inevitably chose the scheme most favorable for her, unless applicable state 
same reasoning conclude that the federal bankruptcy law meets the standards of uniformity if it allows 
without discrimination each state to determine what eve of bankruptcy transfers might be recoverable and 
which might not-as perhaps those to in-state creditors. But that, of course, is patently absurd and 
renders the decision to place the bankruptcy power in the federal government a nullity in spite of the clear 
intent of the Framers. See, e.g., Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 
764 (6th Cir. 2003) (pointing out that the catalyst for the Bankruptcy Clause and the requirement of 
uniformity was to protect against states adopting bankruptcy regimes intended to favor local interests and 
pursuits, all to the disadvantage of the interests of creditors from surrounding states and the larger national 
economy). 
'
72See supra notes 128, 133 and accompanying text. 
173Schafer, 689 F.3d at 610·11 (observing that no one would call this result into question or otherwise 
claim it to be impermissible under the Bankruptcy Clause). 
174 See infra Part V. 
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law prohibits its residents from having their exempt property determined 
under § 522(d). By contrast, when a state adopts a set of bankruptcy-only 
exemptions, it is affirmatively legislating on the subject of bankruptcy in der-
ogation of the power conferred on Congress in the area, and it is expressly 
doing so in a manner that produces non-uniform results both intra and inter-
state. The deferral by Congress to the existing structure of state-created 
rights is one thing, recognition of the rights and limitations legislated by a 
state intended to apply only in bankruptcy cases is quite another.175 The 
current legislative scheme in § 522 simply does not go, and should not be 
construed as going, that far. 176 
Stated another way, in a non-opt-out jurisdiction, there is not much ques-
tion which exemption scheme the debtor will elect; i.e., the one most advan-
tageous to her, so as to maximiz;e the property she may retain in order to 
175Specifically, this exceeds the permissible scope of congressional delegation based on the standard set 
forth in Wil~erson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891), the decision on which the Moyses court relied to 
conclude that § 6 of the former Bankruptcy Act did not constitute an impermissible delegation of author· 
ity. See supra note 144. Rahrer, involved a challenge to an 1890 act of Congress that made the sale of 
liquor manufactured in one state and transported and sold in another subject to the laws of the state into 
which the liquor was imported; a so-called "local option" law. The defendant, a Kansas-based agent for a 
Missouri company, was charged with a misdemeanor under a Kansas law which prohibited him from 
selling a pint of whiskey that had been transported to him, along with other inventory, for such purpose 
by his principal. The defendant urged that the law amounted to an impermissible delegation of Congress's 
exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce. Initially, the Court observed that, "[i]t does not 
admit of argument that congress can neither delegate its own powers, nor enlarge those of a state." Rahrer, 
140 U.S. at 5(50. The Court continued, however, that this did not prevent Congress, in the exercise of its 
constitutional authority, from applying the laws of a state adopted in the proper exercise of that state's 
police powers. That is, that Congress had not delegated to the state permission to adopt regulations in an 
area reserved exclusively to the federal government. Rather, 
[Congress had] simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the state laws 
in respect to imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence 
of a specific utterance on its part. It imparted no power to the state not then 
possessed, but allowed imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the 
local jurisdiction. 
I d. at 564. By like reasoning, the decision to allow states to have their already existing exemption schemes 
apply in bankruptcy cases filed by their residents is qualitatively different from a decision to allow the 
states to promulgate legislation that operates only in the event of, and only within the parameters, of a 
federal bankruptcy case. As expressed by the court in In re Cross, 255 B.R. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000), 
the power to forbid is not the same as the power to create. 
Thus, in giving states the ability to opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions 
Congress did not give [the states] the authority to create bankruptcy exemptions. 
Instead, what the opt·out represents is a Congressional willingness to recognize the 
generally available exemptions that states have created for their own purposes in 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
Jd. at 34 n.5. 
176See In re Reinhart, 460 B.R. 466, 469 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (urging that § 522(b) should be 
construed so as to avoid a serious question as to its constitutionality), abrogated by Richardson v. Schafer 
(In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied. 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013). 
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facilitate her fresh, start. But when a state, and particularly an opt-out state, 
dictates the property that will be exempt from administration in bankruptcy 
cases brought by its residents, those exemptions will apply177 even if they do 
not represent the most generous scheme of exemptions either in an absolute 
sense or just for that particular debtor at that particular time.17s This sub-
verts the constitutional authority given to the federal government to enact 
bankruptcy laws and, when Congress does legislate in the field, to do so to 
the exclusion of the states.179 While it is true Congress has conferred on the 
states the ability to deprive their residents of the federal bankruptcy exemp-
tions, and thus to have their exemptions determined via incorporation of ex-
isting state law, this is not the same as investing the states with the power to 
legislate bankruptcy exemptions directly, wholly separate and apart from the 
general state law exemptions. As long as the Bankruptcy Clause is not dor-
mant, that is the province of Congress alone. In other words, Congress can 
pass a § 522(d), but a state cannot do so without running afoul of the Bank-
ruptcy Clause. 
The Bankruptcy Clause, like the two other provisions in Article I of the 
Constitution requiring uniformity, 180 was a reaction to the weaknesses and 
inefficiencies associated with erratic, inconsistent, and potentially discrimina-
tory state law in an area deemed to be clothed, or at least from time-to-time 
clothed, with a strong national interest and policy considerations that tran-
scend the more local and parochial interests that animate state law.l81 If, in 
pursuit of that national interest, Congress deems it necessary or desirable to 
177Subject, of course, to any limiting provisions in§ 522, other than in subsection (d). See infra notes 
218-222 and accompanying text for further discussion of the limited scope of the opt-out. 
178The point being that just because bankruptcy-specific statutes promulgated up to now have, largely, 
been more generous than the states' exemptions that apply for all other purposes does not mean that in the 
future a state might, deliberately (or inadvertently in a particular case), adopt legislation that provides the 
debtor with more paltry exemptions than she would enjoy against routine state law judgment collection 
and execution. See infra text accompanying notes 190-194. 
179See supra notes 7, 138-139 and accompanying text. 
180See supra note 132. The Supreme Court addressed the uniformity requirement of the federal taxing 
power, U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8 cl. 1, just two years prior to Moyses in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 
(1900). In that decision, the Court rejected the concept of intrinsic or inherent uniformity in favor of an 
approach requiring that the taxing clause operate without discrimination among the states even though 
the impact of the tax might not impact the states with equal· or even near equal effect. Id. at 89-106 
(focusing on the intent of the Framers). This notion of geographic uniformity requires that the determina-
tion of the property subject to a tax be determined purely as a matter of federal law and without variation 
from state to state. This precludes the idea of a federal tax that adopts state exemptions, the concept of 
geographic uniformity the Court adopted two years later in relation to the Bankruptcy Clause. At least 
one commentator has argued with some force that the Court would have done well in Moyses to follow 
the precedent it had established regarding the meaning of uniformity in 'relation to Congress's Article I 
powers in Knowlton·. See Koffler, supra note 55, at 78-84 ("Tested against the Knowlton doctrine, Moyses' 
recognition of state exemption laws in bankruptcy makes a mockery of the constitutional command of 
uniformity.~). , 
181 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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integrate some non-uniform aspects of state law, Moyses stands for the pro-
position that Congress may lawfully do so; the system is still a uniform sys-
tem. By definition, however, no individual state can assure a uniform system 
of bankruptcy law. Thus, while uniformity does not require that each debtor 
be treated exactly the same, it does require uniformity in terms of effectuat-
ing the ultimate aims of the federal bankruptcy system; e.g., equity, equality, 
and fresh start. This is where the federal interest lies and it cannot be 
achieved if individual states have the ability to legislate distributional conse-
quences in bankruptcy with only, as must necessarily be the case, local rather 
than national interests in mind. 
Indirectly, Judge Cole's opinion in Schafer underscores this point when, as 
part of the Supremacy Clause analysis, it suggests that MCL § 600.5451 as-
applied actually furthers federal policy by facilitating the fresh start for 
Michigan bankruptcy debtors because it offers a more generous homestead 
exemption than the state's general exemption statute.182 The structural 
weakness in this rationale, in addition to its dubious unstated assumption 
that bankruptcy serves only a single policy,l83 is that there is absolutely 
nothing to ensure that state legislation in this field, if permitted, will necessa-
rily be more beneficent to bankruptcy debtors than routine judgment debtors. 
The possibility of a less (or even ambiguously more) generous bankruptcy-
specific exemption scheme leads naturally to consideration of the court's 
treatment of the challenge to MCL § 600.5451 based on the Supremacy 
Clause. 
B. THE SuPREMACY CLAUSE AND PREEMPTION ANALYSIS 
It will be recalled that the BAP in Schafer, having concluded that MCL 
§ 500.6461 was unconstitutional under the uniformity requirement in the 
Bankruptcy Clause, did not reach the question of the constitutionality the 
statute under the Supremacy Clause.184 The Sixth Circuit's analysis on that 
issue, discussed above, 185 seems generally sound as it relates to express pre-
emption,186 and perhaps the first form of implied preemption; i.e., field pre-
emption, although the court largely deferred to earlier precedent on that 
182See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
183See supra text accompanying note 98; infra note 212 and accompanying text. See also supra note 2. 
Likewise, because of the discharge in bankruptcy, the consequences of declaring property to be exempt are 
different as well. See supra text accompanying note 231. 
184See supra text accompanying note 98. The bankruptcy court had concluded that there was no 
preemption issue since the statute did not interfere with the basic objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. In 
re Jones. 428 B.R. 720, 727·28 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010). 
185See supra text accompanying notes 120·125. 
186Congress may withdraw any power from the state by enacting a statute with an express preemp· 
tion clause. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500·01 (2012). The history of 
U.S. Bankruptcy law, at least since 1867, demonstrates that express preemption does not apply to the 
determination of property exemptions. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). 
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question. 187 While not all courts and judges necessarily concur in this analy-
sis, 188 nonetheless, in all fairness, it seems difficult to support the proposition 
that federal regulation as to exempt property in bankruptcy is so pervasive 
that it can be regarded as wholly occupying the field when the federal scheme 
not only recogniz.es the possible application of state exemptions in bank-
ruptcy, but actually confers on the states the power to make their general 
exemptions controlling in bankruptcy cases. 
On the other hand, the Shafer court's treatment of the other form of 
implied preemption, conflict preemption, is somewhat more problematic. Spe-
cifically, the court predicated.its conclusion that the statute at issue did not 
interfere with federal bankruptcy policy on the basis that bankruptcy-spe-
cific-exemptions were no more likely to frustrate the full effectiveness of the 
national bankruptcy laws than use of a state's general exemptions, an ap-
proach that, the court remarked, has been determined to be ""wholly appropri-
ate under existing law." 189 And yet, the argument proves too much, as the 
court tacitly allows in a footnote where it acknowledges that certain unlim-
ited state exemption laws might indeed undermine national policy but then 
draws comfort that these situations have been tempered by BAPCPA.l90 
The point, as is addressed below,191 is that it is one thing for Congress to 
determine that a federal rule may turn on how a subject is treated by a state 
for its own purposes, but quite another to conclude that, in so doing, Con-
187See supra note 122. See also Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
there can be no field preemption where Congress has expressly authori2:ed the states to act in rel~tion to 
the subject). 
188See, e.g., In re Regevig, 389.B.R. 736, 740 ("Congress has pervasively defined the exemptions that a 
state may permit a debtor to claim only in a bankruptcy case, even if they are not generally exempt from 
creditors outside of bankruptcy. Those are the exemptions defined by Bankruptcy Code § 522(d). And 
Congress further specified exactly how a state might make those bankruptcy-specific exemptions availa· 
ble-by not opting out pursuant to Code § 522(b)(2). Where Congress has already defined both the 
substantive law and the procedure, in a pervasive federal scheme that generally pre·empts State legislation, 
Congress has occupied the field.") (emphasis added); Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 
694 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (Markell, J., dissenting) (discussing the primacy of federal law). See also 
Lamport, supra note 3 5, at 606·11 (arguing that the federal government has occupied the field of bank· 
ruptcy legislation and, therefore, state·enacted bankruptcy-only exemptions are preempted even though 
they may not be in actual conflict with specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code). 
189Schafer, 689 F.3d at 615 (observing that, via§ 522(b), Congress has already allowed for variations 
in how states treat bankruptcy exemptions, and this situation would seem no different). The court also 
distinguished the Ninth Circuit's decision rendered under the former Bankruptcy Act in Kanter v. Money· 
ma~er (In re Kanter), 505 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), on the basis that the statute invalidated in that case, 
defeasing the trustee of any interest in a prepetition personal injury lawsuit, directly conflicted with the 
provisions of the Act defining the property of the estate. Schafer, 689 F.3d at 613 n.6. Whether the 
distinction is as clear as the court endeavored to make it is open to some question. See infra note 226. 
Also, the constitutionality of the opt·out, while surviving challenge thus far, is not a dead letter. See 
generally Austin, supra note 61. 
190Schafer, 689 F.3d at 615 n.7. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text discussing these 
changes under the 2005 Amendments. 
191See infra text accompanying notes 215·217. 
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gress intended (and has the constitutional authority) to relinquish 1ts explicit 
power to determine the contours of the rule and how it shall operate. 
In addition to the failure to find a distinction between the use of a state's 
general exemptions and a bankruptcy-specific exemption schema, Judge Cole, 
as noted above,192 also pointed up that MCL § 600.5451 actually furthers 
rather than conflicts ~ith federal policy in the field since it expands a debtor's 
fresh start. The clear but unstated implication is that if a state-enacted bank-
ruptcy-specific exemption scheme made a bankruptcy debtor's exemptions 
less generous than those enjoyed by judgment debtors in the state generally, 
the court would strike it based on conflict preemption. Even if true, the 
. problem with this approach is two-fold; practical and doctrinal. 
First, a bankruptcy-only exemption. scheme, even if clearly mandated 
under state law, may not be definitively or consistently either more or less 
generous than the state's regular list of exempt property or assets. 19 3 This 
could arise because the scope of the exempt property is less under the bank-
ruptcy-only scheme, but the dollar amounts for the actual exemptions are 
higher than under the state's general exemptions. Alternatively, the bank-
ruptcy statute could be more generous in terms of the categories of property 
defined as exempt, including perhaps a wildcard, but less generous in one or 
more of these categories of property in terms of the dollar limitation. In 
effect, each debtor's particular circumstances at any given point in time 
would dictate if the bankruptcy exemption scheme were more or less gener-
ous. Thus, there would be no way to say categorically whether the state's 
bankruptcy-only exemption scheme furthered or frustrated the debtor's fresh 
start since, as a practical matter, it would intrinsically do neither (or both) on 
a consistent or predictable basis. 194 In short, just because most bankruptcy-
specific state laws appear (and may have been intended) to favor debtors, 
does not mean they will always do so, 19 5 or that if and when they do the 
192See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
193The fact that the exclusivity of such statutes in adopting states is unclear only exacerbates the 
uncertainty and creates another level of confusion regarding the effect of such laws. See supra text accom-
panying notes 85-89. 
194This is just one of perhaps several problems associated with dealing with state-promulgated bank-
ruptcy-only exemptions on a case-by-case basis, rather than by prophylactic rule. See supra note 129. 
195 As an example where a bankruptcy-specific statute was more restrictive than the general exemp-
tion, and yet sustained in spite of both the Uniformity and the Supremacy Clauses, see In re Joyner, 489 
B.R. 292 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012) (holding that Georgia's bankruptcy-specific exemption scheme, which 
permitted Georgia debtors who had filed for bankruptcy only a limited exemption in cash surrender value 
of life insurance policies and not the broader exemption in such cash surrender values accorded to Georgia 
debtors outside of bankruptcy, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia or United 
States Constitutions, since it was rationally related to differences that existed between policyholders 
seeking to discharge all of their prepetition debts in bankruptcy and policyholders who were not in bank-
ruptcy and, presumably, paying all their legitimate obligations). 
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inquiry is necessarily at an end. 196 Moreover, an approach to conflict pre-
emption that focuses only on conflict with the fresh start doctrine overlooks 
the fact that the purpose of the federal bankruptcy law is not wholly con-
fined to providing a fresh start for debtors; rather, bankruptcy policy seeks to 
accommodate the interests of creditors as well as debtors. 197 
Second, in the paragraph in Schafer just preceding the paragraph in which 
Judge Cole discusses the impact of MCL § 600.5451 on an as-applied basis, 
he seems to negate the argument that a less generous state bankruptcy ex-
emption scheme might be constitutionally invalid. Specifically, in rebuffing 
the trustee's argument that a more generous set of bankruptcy-only state 
exemptions might operate as a disincentive to creditors that have reason to 
and might otherwise be inclined to file an involuntary petition, the court 
states that~§ 522 imposes no restrictions on the concurrent authority of the 
states to enact bankruptcy-specific exemption statutes. We will not read any 
such restriction into another section of the Code, such as § 303, that has 
nothing to do with exemptions." 198 If no restriction on the concurrent au-
thority of the states is to be found in § 522 or elsewhere in the Code, then 
the conclusion ineluctably must be that the states have carte blanche in forg-
ing their exemption schemas, despite the fact that they might conflict with, 
or at least hinder the attainment of, the purposes and objectives of the federal 
bankruptcy law. And yet, it is hard to imagine that this could be so and not 
compromise the Supremacy Clause.199 
In sum, it is not a question of whether any particular bankruptcy-only 
statute operates at any particular point in time to undermine fundamental 
bankruptcy policy.200 Rather, it is the risk that such legislation can, in both 
easily detectable and far less palpable ways, have such an impact from time-
to-time that is crucial to the preemption analysis. The bankruptcy court in 
In re Cross201 seemed to apprehend and articulate the point most clearly. 
The case involved an Indiana statute that permitted an exemption in bank-
196See In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 736, 740 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008) (citing Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1203·06 (2005) for the proposition that a showing of actual prejudice in the 
case at hand is not necessary to support a challenge based either on the Bankruptcy or the Supremacy 
Clause). Likewise, a state statue cannot be sustained on the basis that the legislature did not intend to 
frustrate the operation of federal law. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651·52 (1971) (rejecting the 
view that frustration should be measured solely by the purpose of a state law and not necessarily its 
effect). 
197See infra text accompanying notes 211·213; supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
198Schafer, 689 F.3d at 616. 
1991f not, then the whole purpose behind the Bankruptcy Clause of overriding the shortcomings of the 
Articles of Confederation and curbing the potential for states· abuse of power in the arena of debtor I 
creditor relationships would be relegated to oblivion. See supra notes 133·134 and accompanying text. 
200See supra text accompanying notes 193·194, 196. 
201 255 B.R. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000). 
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ruptcy for a debtor's interest in property held as a tenant by the entireties,202 
even though outside of bankruptcy Indiana law allows entireties property to 
be used to satisfy the claims of joint creditors (of the tenants), albeit not the 
claims of individual creditors of either tenant/spouse. The debtor in this case 
relied on that statute to assert entitlement to an exemption for certain real 
property owned by him and his nondebtor spouse as tenants by the entire-
ties. The trustee objected to the exemption on the ground that the Indiana 
statute was unconstitutional since it prevented him from reaching and ad-
ministering assets that, outside of bankruptcy, could be reached at least to 
some extent by the debtor's creditors.203 
Relying on Moyses, the court initially rejected the argument that the stat-
ute was infirm based on the uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy 
Clause.204 With regard to the preemption argument, however, the trustee 
found a much more sympathetic audience. The court began its analysis by 
observing that the determination of where the balance should be struck be-
tween the interests of debtors and creditors goes to the heart of the bank-
ruptcy process and is an exercise that has been consigned to Congress alone. 
205 Thus, the court continued, a state law that might alter that balance in 
the event of bankruptcy, as contrasted with a decision by Congress to recog-
nize a state-created right or nonbankruptcy entitlement, interferes with na-
tional policy in two respects: (1) changing the way Congress chose to allocate 
the consequences of bankruptcy between debtors and creditors,2°6 and (2) 
conflicting with the statutory framework Congress created for dealing with 
entireties property in a bankruptcy case filed by only one spouse.207 To illus-
trate its point, the court in Cross hypothesized, at the antipodal extremes, 
that a state might either pass a law eliminating all exemptions for bankruptcy 
debtors or enact a law exempting all of the debtor's property upon filing. In 
either case, whether, respectively, eroding or enhancing the fresh start (and 
202The statute, IND. CoDE§ 34·2·28·1(a)(5), provided an exemption for any interest in real estate held 
by the debtor as a tenant by the entireties as of the date of filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, 
unless the case was filed as a joint petition, which was not the case in Cross. 
203Cross, 255 B.R. at 32. 
204Jd. at 31 (holding that since the ~Uniformity Clause" does not apply to the states, the state statute 
could not be challenged directly or indirectly under the constitutional provision giving Congress the 
power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies). 
205ld. at 32·33 (noting that while one might question or even disagree with how Congress has resolved 
the tension between these competing interests, ~it was Congress's right to make those decisions and the 
states cannot change the balance that Congress has struck."). 
206ld. at 36 (observing as well that Indiana is free to create whatever exemptions it wishes, or none at 
all; but what it may not do is create (or deny) exemptions solely by reason of bankruptcy). The court 
went on to note that the effect of the Indiana statute is to treat trustees less favorably than judgment 
creditors outside of bankruptcy in violation of the Supremacy Clause. I d. 
207See Code§ 522(b)(3)(B) dealing with property held as tenants by the entireties where only one of 
the tenant-spouses seeks relief in bankruptcy. 
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simultaneously increasing or decreasing payment to creditors), the state 
would quite obviously be improperly interfering in an area of the law that the 
Constitution assigns exclusively (when it chooses to act) to Congress and, 
thus, hindering the full accomplishment of the purposes underlying the Bank-
ruptcy Code.208 
The key take-away from Cross is that it largely does not matter what any 
particular bankruptcy-specific statute does or does not do; whether it en-
hances or frustrates the fresh start. Nor does it matter that no state is likely 
to adopt either of the extreme examples set forth in Cross and thereby radi-
cally alter the balance between a debtor and her creditors by making all or 
none of her property exempt in bankruptcy. Rather, as the court put it in 
Cross: "[i]f it is permissible for the states to meddle with federal law in small 
ways, they may also do so in more significant ways .... [they] may either 
interfere with federal law or they may not."209 The court also addressed the 
argument raised by another bankruptcy court,210 and that would later be 
ra-ised again by the Sixth Circuit in Schafer,211 that a state law that provides 
more favorable exemptions to a bankruptcy debtor than those otherwise 
available under state law is not assailable under conflict preemption since it 
actually fosters rather than frustrates bankruptcy policy by enhancing the 
debtor's fresh start. The court in Cross rejected the argument as too simplis-
tic, since it necessarily focuses on only one of several competing objectives 
that the bankruptcy system seeks to attain.212 This observation underscores 
the fact that ascertaining whether a state law advances or hinders bank-
ruptcy policy is an inexact science fraught with the risk of miscalculation to 
begin with213 ; a risk that is exacerbated by the fact that bankruptcy policy is 
neither static nor monolithic. This is why the power to make bankruptcy 
208Cross, 255 B.R. at 34·35. The latter scheme would likely fail under the Contracts Clause as tanta-
mount to a state-granted discharge. See supra note 138. 
209Cross, 255 B.R. at 35. 
210ln re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (sustaining an Ohio bankruptcy-only exemption). 
211See supra notes 125, 189 and accompanying text. 
212Cross, 255 B.R. at 35-36. The Cross court pointed out that the Vas~o decision sustained the 
statute in question since it furthered federal fresh start policy, but neglected to recognize and take into 
account that bankruptcy also seeks to assure maximization of value for creditors. See also Stellwagen v. 
Clum, 245 U.S. 605,616 (1918) (explaining the federal system of bankruptcy is designed to assure the fair 
and equitable treatment of creditors as well as aid the unfortunate debtor by providing her with a fresh 
start). The point to be made is that this delicate balance, once struck by Congress, can only be tottered 
once the states are permitted to pass legislation affecting it, regardless of the motivation underlying such 
legislation. Cross 255 B.R. at 38. 
213See supra text accompanying notes 193-196. See also In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 736, 740 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 2008) (pointing out that a challenge to a statute based on eith~r the Bankruptcy or the Supremacy 
Clauses does not require a showing of actual prejudice arising from application of the statute in the case at 
hand). 
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laws rests with Congress, and it is a power that when exercised must operate 
to the exclusion of the states. 
Notwithstanding the decision in Cross, and other similar cases,214 the 
growing judicial approbation of the notion that, regardless of where Congress 
decides to place the normative fulcrum in terms of balancing the interests of 
debtor relief and creditor rights, the states can alter the distributional conse-
quences of bankruptcy by promulgating legislation that applies only in bank-
ruptcy cases raises serious concern. Of necessity, this not only potentially 
undermines congressional decision making in a manner that ought to be re-
garded as suspect under ordinary principles of federalism, but also does so in 
the face of Congress's constitutional preeminence to determine national pol-
icy in the area.215 While one might fairly question, as I do,216 Congress's 
decision to allow the states to bar their citiz;ens who file bankruptcy from 
claiming t~e § 522( d) exemptions, that ·is quite different from concluding that 
Congress may, and indeed ha:s,, delegated to each state the power to control 
and define· the scope of exemption policy in bankruptcy, wholly apart from 
the policy judgments that underlie that jurisdiction's rules rela~ing to prop-
erty exempt from routine judgment collection efforts. 
It is certainly true that the case law approving the states' prerogative to 
promulgate bankruptcy-specific exemptions under § 522(b) appears at least 
to place some limits on that authority; to wit, reserving the right to strike any 
such law if its application is found to interfere with full attainment of the 
purposes and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code21 7 The lack, however, of 
any guidance as to the means and method by which that not insubstantial 
determination is to be made suggests that little comfort ought to be derived 
from that ~aveat.218 The issue is not simply striking a state statute that, as 
214See supra note 35. 
215This might occur, for example, by giving the state's debtors a head start at the expense of national 
creditors more likely to be affected by a bankruptcy filing. This is why, as the court in Cross understood, 
recogni•ing state exemptions in bankruptcy as a matter of federal determination is not the same as allowing 
states to create exemptions just for these proceedings. Cross, 255 B.R. at 34. See also Regevig, 389 B.R. at 
741 (holding that there is "no room for states to adopt their own bankruptcy-specific exemptions by a 
procedure other than that provided by the Code, i.e., not opting out of the Bankruptcy Code's 
exemptions."). 
216See infra Part V. 
217See, e.g., In re Westby, 473 B.R. 392, 413. n.147 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012), affd, 486 B.R. 509 (B.A.P. 
lOth Cir. 2013) ("Of course, the Court can imagine scenarios where a state enacts an exemption scheme so 
contrary to the bankruptcy fresh start or the ratable distribution of assets that the exemptions conflict 
wi~h the purpose and objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. That scenario is simply not present here."). 
218See supra text accompanying notes 193-196 (addressing the potential difficulty in ascertaining 
whether any particular statute in any particular case does or does not interfere with achievement of the 
full objectives of the Bankruptcy Code). In his dissenting opinion in Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Apple-
baum), 422 B.R. 684, 693 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009), Judge Markell warned that, even if the majority's 
interpretation of § 522(b) to permit incorporation of state-enacted exemptions was correct, having the 
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Judge Cole stated, "'frustrates" rather than "'furthers" the fresh start policy,21 9 
such as, to use the extreme example offered by the bankruptcy court in Cross, 
a state law providing that the debtors from that state shall not be entitled to 
exempt any property in bankruptcy.220 Rather, the issue is how, on a princi-
pled and consistent basis, to identify and draw an unambiguous distinction 
between those exemption statutes that "'further" and those that (or might) 
"'frustrate" not just the fresh start policy, but also the competing objectives 
sought to be served by the federal bankruptcy law. The short answer is that 
it cannot be done. 
There are also any number of other instances where a state-enacted bank-
ruptcy-specific exemption rule would doubtless be impermissible. For in-
stance, as noted earlier, in order to preclude their debtors from stacking 
exemptions in jointly administered cases, 221 some states opted-out of the 
federal exemptions, but then proceeded to adopt their own very similar bank-
ruptcy exemptions. And, yet, because the Code was. later amended to ex-
pressly prohibits stacking,222 a non-opt state, even though wishing to further 
the federal fresh start policy, could not now pass a law that permitted 
spouses to stack exemptions by allowing each to elect a different set of ex-
emptions. Similarly, a state statute that recognized in bankruptcy a waiver of 
exemptions in favor of unsecured creditors would never be tolerated.223 This 
highlights the fact that "delegation" to the states of authority to opt-out of 
the federal exemptions should not reflexively be considered as a wholesale 
delegation to the states of authority, or an abnegation of federal control, over 
exemption policy in bankruptcy. Section 522(b)(2) does not grant the states 
validity of statutes analyzed on a case-by-case basis, with no underlying guidelines was of questionable 
wisdom. Id. at 697. 
219Schafer, 689 F.3d at 616. 
220See supra note 208. Rarely will the situation ever be this obvious, and the uncertainty over where 
to draw the lines is itself damaging to the system as it imposes a cost of uncertainty. Surely, the propo· 
nents of allowing the states this authority will argue how is this any different from a state eliminating 
exemptions across the board, not just in bankruptcy? See Schafer, 689 F.3d at 614·15. In one sense, it is 
not; in the unlikely event the state legislature has the political will to take such action. However, in that 
situation, the state would not be discriminating between bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy debtors, a situa· 
tion never contemplated by the opt·out, and compromising bankruptcy policy in the process. Moreover, in 
that situation, Congress might eventually react, just as it has in the case of the states like Florida and 
Texas that went the other direction with respect to the homestead, and limit the extent of state incorpo· 
ration by, for example, allowing use of some or all of the § 522(d) exemptions in those situations. See 
supra text accompanying notes 28· 31. In any case, the issue is not whether the debtor is denied any 
exemptions, but rather whether the debtor is denied any exemptions because of Congress' decision to 
recognize state law of general applicability. That's quite different from a debtor being denied any exemp· 
tions because the state has denied its citizens certain rights that they enjoy outside of bankruptcy. And, of 
course, the same can be said about the state creating rights that apply only in bankruptcy. 
221See supra notes 76·77 and accompanying text. 
222See Code § 522(b)(1), as to which the states have no authority to "opt·out." 
223See Code § 522(e); supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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anything even approaching that degree of autonomy.22 4 Rather, the delega-
tion must be understood as limited not only by its explicit terms (i.e., the 
ability to deny residents access to the federal exemptions), but also by the 
parameters that defined core bankruptcy policy. Thus, as bankruptcy-only 
exemptions were "'for all intents and purposes unknown when Congress 
adopted the opt-out provision,225 it is fanciful to regard its enabling authority 
as extending to permission to enact bankruptcy-specific legislation,226 even to 
the extent such a delegation would be constitutionally permissible in the first 
place. 
V. MANDA TORY FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTIONS, 
THEN AND NOW 
A. THE 0PT-0UT REVISITED 
The fact that the exemptions available to a debtor in bankruptcy have 
historically served as a proxy for battles over issues other than the optimal 
level of property necessary, given the competing interests of creditors, to best 
effectuate the debtor's fresh start has hampered the development of a rational 
approach to exemption policy in bankruptcy. By definition, that policy is not 
identical with the policy governing exemptions from judgment execution. As 
earlier noted,Z27 the question addressed by state law is what property (or 
what property up to a particular dollar value), while held in a particular form, 
should be exempt from execution by judgment creditors? In bankruptcy, on 
the other hand, the question is how much property is reasonably necessary to 
facilitate the debtor's return to economic viability-regardless of what justifi-
cation one accepts of the reason for offering a fresh start in the first 
place228-taking into account the fact that the debtor is being absolved from 
future liability for all but a handful of debts that either were the product of 
opprobrious debtor conduct or implicate competing interests that trump the 
discharge. 229 Indeed, one view of the fresh start is that the debtor's nonex-
224See T ABB, supra note 31, at § 9.2, p. 870. (observing the importance of taking note that the opt-out 
applies only to the ability to claim the § 522(d) exemptions and does not apply to the rest of§ 522). 
225 See supra note 146. 
226See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 313 (1991) ("We have no basis for pronouncing the opt-out 
policy absolute, but must apply it along with whatever other competing or limiting policies the statute 
contains."). See also Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 694·95 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) 
(Markell,]., dissenting) (arguing that state-enacted bankruptcy-only exemptions thwart the federal bank-
ruptcy scheme) (relying on Kanter v. Moneymaker (In re Kanter), 505 F.2d 228,230-31 (9th Cir. 1974), a 
Bankruptcy Act case in which the court held that a state statute that deprived the trustee, and only the 
trustee, of assets that could be reached by general creditors violated the Supremacy Clause, inasmuch as 
the decision to recognize state exemptions did not mean that Congress was providing the states with a 
"free hand to circumscribe the powers of the bankruptcy trustee."). 
227See supra text accompanying notes 12-13; Applebaum, 422 B.R. at 694·95 (Markell,]., dissenting). 
228 See supra note 1. 
229See Ponoroff. supra note 4, at 2555 (discussing the fact that the presumption is in favor of discharge, 
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empt assets are being surrendered in return for a discharge.230 This would, 
for instance, make an unlimited homestead exemption, that might be justified 
under state law (since the value of the residence cannot be used for other 
purposes without exposing it to execution by creditors), suspect in bank-
ruptcy. By the same token, however, failure to provide debtors with a mean-
ingfully adequate quantum of property frustrates national fresh start policy, 
but that is precisely a possibility permitted under the Code's current chaotic 
approach to exemptions.231 
In sharp contrast to state collection law, bankruptcy also seeks to maxi-
mize value for creditors as a whole, and to promote equality among similarly 
positioned creditors. The latter objective is, however, subject to any number 
of exceptions in specific instances where other policy considerations are re-
garded as paramount. The categories of debt entitled to priority under § 507 
represent a notable example of this on-going balancing exercise. Focusing on 
this fact, in a recent article,232 Professors Mark Roe and Fredrick Tung argue 
that bankruptcy is not the static, contractarian institution that dominated 
much of the earlier thinking about bankruptcy by theorists who share with 
them an economic-based approach to the subject.233 Rather, they maintain, it 
is a dynamic process that is rife with rent-seeking behavior, the costs of 
which tax the efficiency (costs of uncertainty) of the bankruptcy process. 
Creditors constantly invent new transactions, they point out, pursue new 
court doctrines, and lobby legislatures for new rules that yield them higher 
priority.234 Of course, an alternative way to view the behavior that Roe and 
Tung in the main condemn as contrary to the efficiency of a purely con-
tractarian model235 is as the inevitable by-product of a system that seeks 
though certain categories of debt are then excepted, based either on conduct surrounding the incurring of 
the debt or in order to serve other societal interests that compete with the fresh start). 
230See Stellwagen v. Glum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1917) ("The federal system of bankruptcy is designed 
not only to distribute the property of the estate, not by law exempted, fairly and equally among his 
creditors, but as a main purpose by giving him a fresh start in life .... Our decisions lay great stress upon 
this feature of the law ... in that it secures to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his property for 
distribution, a new opportunity in life."). See also Mooney, supra note 1, at 104 7 ("Offering a discharge as 
a tool for inducing debtor cooperation also was a justification advanced for the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in 
the United States. And this concept continues to play a role in the availability of a discharge under 
current law."). · 
231See supra notes 28·31 and accompanying text. 
232Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Brea~ing Ban~ruptcy Priority: How Rent·See~ing [)pends the Credi· 
tors' Bargain, 99 VA. L. REv. 1235 (2013). 
233The genre dates back to Tom Jackson's "creditors' bargain" normative account of bankruptcy law. 
See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Ban~ruptcy, N.on-Ban~ruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 
YALE L.J. 857 (1982). 
234Roe & Tung, supra note 232, at 1270·72. The authors fashion their understanding as "dynamic 
creditor bargains," as creditors continually strive to alter the existing priority framework by changing the 
rules in their favor. 
235The authors concede that some of the changes to priority and distribution rules occasioned by rent· 
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simultaneously to accommodate multiple goals and objectives that are not 
always complementary, and at times even antithetical.236 And yet, this is 
precisely the role that a system of federal bankruptcy laws occupies, and one 
that could only be occupied at the national level, as the Framers well knew 
and understood.237 
The Code's unfortunate opt-out compromise has undoubtedly weakened 
the achievement of these unique goals of federal bankruptcy law. Even more 
insidiously, however, because of its amenability to what likely amounts to a 
more expansive interpretation than it deserves,238 it has also spawned the 
current constitutional uncertainties surrounding bankruptcy-only exemp-
tions. As the discord in the case law amply attests, these constitutional ques-
tions are hardly trifling. They are, however, easily avoided. Indeed, the fact 
that, in the main, bankruptcy-specific exemption statutes are not less gener-
ous than the general exemption schemas in the states that have adopted 
them-thereby averting what could be a successful preemption challenge-
highlights the fact that one of the salient political considerations that led to 
the Code's current approach to exemptions-that the § 522(d) exemptions 
were simply too debtor oriented-has largely abated.239 That approach, as 
will be recalled,240 represented a last-minute compromise in the run-up to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 between the House bill, which created a set 
seeking behavior do facilitate new and more efficient modes of financing. Jd. at 1275. Ultimately, how-
ever, they largely condemn the practice as adding new costs associated with, inter alia, attempting to 
influence rule makers, adjusting to new rules, and generally from the uncertainties involved in an environ-
ment where priority rules are continually changing-and changing in potentially non-uniform ways, id. at 
1272-78. 
236This is the criticism generally of the narrow, ~proceduralist" view of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Vern 
Countryman, 'The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Ban~ruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 827 (1985). 
Professor Countryman, in discussing Jackson's creditors' bargain model, opined that it assumes that ~every 
creditor-apparently including asbestos victims and other tort claimants ... -will have full information 
and competent legal advice in dealing with the debtor. They assume further that every creditor will make 
the same assumptions they do and bring to bear their same highly skilled free market economic analysis 
... ." I d. at 827. The adherents of the more expansive ~practicalist" account that regards the bankruptcy 
system as advancing independent and unique substantive goals, separate and apart from state commercial 
law, is most closely associated with the work of Professor (now Senator) Warren. See Elizabeth Warren, 
Ban~ruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775 (1987). The terms "proceduralist" and "practicalist" come from 
Adam]. Levitin, 'Toward a Federal Common Law of Ban~ruptcy:Judicial Lawma~ing in a Statutory Regime, 
80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2006). The two views about the scope and content of bankruptcy purposes 
and policies are also reviewed in Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, 'The Implied Good Faith 
Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Ban~ruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 919, 948-955 (1992) 
(utilizing the rubric of collectivist vs. traditionalist thought). 
237See supra notes 271-272 and accompanying text. 
238The two positions as to whether or not Congress has delegated authority to the states (separate 
and apart from the issue of the permissibility of such a delegation) by means of the opt-out can be found in, 
respectively, the majority and dissenting opinions in Stic~a v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
239See infra text accompanying notes 247·250. 
240See supra note 21. 
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of federal exemptions and gave the debtor the right to choose between those 
exemptions and the debtor's applicable state exemptions,241 and the Senate 
Bill, which continued the practice under the former Act of simply incorporat-
ing the debtor's state and nonbankruptcy federal exemptions.242 Many com-
mentators regard the solution ultimately adopted-the House approach but 
with the ability of the states to take away that choice for their residents-as 
ilkonsidered.243 Others see in it a calculated attempt to appease those inter-
ests that felt strongly about state control, but otherwise allow for federal 
control, as the Commission had urged in its 1973 Report,244 where sentiment 
was less intense.245 All agree that the compromise was decidedly a political 
one.246 
At the time that bankruptcy reform was being debated in the 1970s, 
state exemption laws, with certain notable exceptions, were largely anti-
quated and out-of date both with respect to the type of property declared to 
be exempt and as to the value of exempt property entitled to protection.247 
241 H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. § 522 (1978). This structure was proposed originally in a bill advanced by 
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. See H.R. 32, 94th Cong. (1975); S. 235, 94th Cong. 
(1975). Under this proposal the federal exemptions would serve, effectively, as a floor. The House Report 
on the bill expressed the sentiment: 
Though exemption laws have been considered within the province of State law 
under the current Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 8200 adopts the position that there is a 
Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out 
with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. Recognizing, however, that cir· 
cumstances do vary in different parts of the country, the bill permits the states to 
set exemption levels appropriate to the locale and allows debtors to choose between 
the State exemptions and the Federal exemptions provided in the bill. 
H.R. REP. No. 95·595, at 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. 
242S. 2266, 95th Con g. § 522 ( 1978). In the final a compromise, the dollar amounts in the House Bill 
were reduced, the Senate's version of § 522(1)(2) ultimately was adopted, along with the opt·out provi· 
sions of§ 522(b)(l). See Brown, supra note 18, at 160. See generally Michael Terry Hem:, Ban~ruptcy 
Code Exemptions: Notes on the Effect of State Law, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ. 339 (1980); Vukowich, supra note 
45. 
243Brown, supra note 18; Countryman, supra note 12; Vern Countryman, Ban~ruptcy and the Individ· 
ual Debtor-And a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 809, 
819·20 (1983) (vehemently criticizing the opt·out in§ 522(b)); Haines, supra note 19; Hert~;, supra note 
242, at 339 (calling the opt·out compromise "unfortunate"); Richard E. Mendales, Rethin~ing Exemptions 
in Ban~ruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REv. 851,851 (1999) (calling the current system "far too complex, inconsistent, 
inequitable, burdensome ... and rife with moral ha.ard); Ponoroff. supra note 18. 
244 Supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
245See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Ban~ruptcy Reform Act of 1978.96 MICH. L. REv. 
47, 107-08 (1997) (opining that, as a result of the opt·out, "the federal government picked up some power 
without offending those with the most to lose."). 
246See. e.g., SuLLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 19, at 28 (observing that with the opt·out "[c]ongress once 
again sidestepped a sticky political issue by leaving the decision to the state legislatures."); Lawrence 
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Ban~ruptcy: Villains 
or Victims of the Fresh Start 7 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235,253 n.76 (1995) (discussing authorities that describe 
§ 522(b)(l) as a political compromise). 
247See Lowell P. Bottrell, Comfortable Beds, A Church Pew, A Cemetery Lot, One Hog, One Pig, Six 
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Spurred to a considerable extent by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
many states subsequently modernized and expanded the scope of their general 
exemptions, sometimes in connection with the enactment of opt-out legisla-
tion and sometime independently.248 That trend has continued to the pre-
sent, including, more recently, the proliferation of bankruptcy-specific 
exemptions schemes.249 In an ironic sort of way, one of the effects of this 
gradual conflation in the scope and content of state and federal bankruptcy 
exemptions has been to blunt many of the arguments that historically had 
been mustered in opposition to mandatory federal exemptions in bankruptcy 
and that resulted in the Code's opt-out mechanism in the first place.250 
To begin with, as Professor Eric Posner pointed out in 1997, the issue 
was never one purely of federalism, as it was often postured,Z51 but rather 
also a question of control over the "content" of exemption laws.2 5 2 Posner 
Sheep, One Cow, a Yol~ of Oxen or a Horse, and Your N,otary Seal: Some 'Thoughts About Exemptions, 72 
N.D. L. REv. 83, 91·92 (1996) (noting the lack of much rhyme and reason to many state exemption 
schemes); Countryman, supra note 12, at 681-83 (expressing the view that state legislatures really did not 
care much about exemptions). See also Raymond C. Marier, Ban~ruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Bac~ to 
the Act of 18007, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 663, 663-65 (1968) (arguing that reliance on state exemptions is 
confusing and inadequate); Note, Ban~ruptcy Exemptions: Critique & Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1463 
(1959) (describing state exemption statutes at the time as having been "fashioned on an anvil of nineteenth 
century economics and politics."). 
248See, e.g., Brown, supra note 18, at 163 (discussing the frequency of states' amendments of their 
exemptions since 1979); Haines, supra note 19, at 14 n.50 (cataloguing the states that, in connection with 
passing opt-out legislation, adopted extensive revisions to their general state exemptions; largely revisions 
that expanded these exemptions); Mendales, supra note 243, at 867 n.135 ("Several states have modern-
i•ed their exemption laws in recent years, in part responding to the 197C Commission's report and the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.~) (citing William]. Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, 
and Ban~ruptcy Refonn, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 344-45 (1982)). See also Dionne v. Harless (In re Harless), 
187 B.R. 719, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) ("Many states have updated their exemptions in recent years to 
shelter retirement assets from debt collection."). Cf In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317, 322-23 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1980) (noting that in order to enhance a fresh start for debtors, Congress, in enacting to Code, not only 
included a liberal exemption scheme, but also encouraged the states to update and liberalue their own 
exemption laws). 
249-fhe BAP in Schafer identified nine states, including Michigan, that have enacted exemptions that 
only apply in Bankruptcy. Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 455 B.R. 590, 599 n.10 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
2011), ret!'d, 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013). Clearly, however, the 
number is under-inclusive as it excludes, among others, Arkansas and Kansas. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 16-
66-218 (2012); supra note 78 (detailing a comparable approach taken in New York). The inexactitude of 
the count likely is the product of the diversity in types of bankruptcy-only exemption statutes as discussed 
supra Part II. 
250See infra text accompanying notes 271-273. 
251See 124 GoNG REC. 17,406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (heralding the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act's rejection of mandatory federal exemptions as a "victory for states' rights~ and 
the ability of the states to know best and provide for the needs of their cituens ). See also Kennedy, supra 
note 17, at 452 (stating in relation to the idea of returning to the listing in the federal bankruptcy law of 
specific items of property to be exempt in bankruptcy cases, "[r]eservations may thus be legitimately 
entertained regarding the wisdom as well as the political feasibility of a uniform law of exemptions in 
bankruptcy."). 
252Posner, supra note 245, at 95·96. 
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suggested that the ability to dictate exemption policy was generally more 
valuable to state and local politicians than to federal politicians, and hence 
the decision to allow the states to preclude their debtors from claiming the 
§ 522(d) exemptions.253 For instance, he theoriz;ed that the differing ap-
proaches toward exemptions in the House and Senate bills prior to enactment 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was explicable in terms of the relative 
difference in the locus of political power between representatives and sena-
tors, as well as the disproportionate impact of less populous, rural states in 
the Senate as compared with the House.254 Posner described the opt-out 
compromise, therefore, as "ingeniously" retaining federal control over exemp-
tion policy in states where interest in the subject was low, but preserving the 
prerogative of the states in those situations (which turned out apparently to 
be most) where the state had a strong interest in controlling exemption 
levels-whether in order to compel its debtors to use lower value state ex-
emptions, or permit its debtors the ability to use exemptions higher, than the 
federal bankruptcy exemptions. 
While this solution may have been "ingenious" from the perspective of 
political expediency, it was dreadful policy. A uniform bankruptcy law may 
not require that all debtors be treated the same, but it should be construed to 
assure that the bankruptcy law operates in a uniform fashion insofar as imple-
menting essential bankruptcy policy is concerned.255 A law which deprives 
some debtors of minimally adequate exemptions, while placing nearly all the 
assets of other debtors beyond the reach of the trustee, fails this standard of 
uniformity miserably. The situation has been made all the more distressing 
given the weight of more recent authority rejecting constitutional challenges 
to bankruptcy-specific exemptions, thus opening the door further to the kind 
of jumble of individual state practices that accounted for the decision to "fed-
eraliz;e" bankruptcy law in the first place.256 What these judicial decisions 
overlook is that the original legislative decision by Congress to incorporate 
state law of general applicability in this area, however unwise, is something 
quite different from approving a delegation to the state legislatures of the 
253 I d. at 10 1·04 (noting, for instance, that insurance companies had done well at the state level, since 
high exemptions for insurance would cause debtors considering bankruptcy to sell nonexempt assets and 
purchase exempt policies). 
254Jd. at 106·07. Thus, the Senate bill reflected greater deference to the states in the matter of exemp· 
tion policy. 
255lnt'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 263·65 (1928) (holding that a state is without power to 
enforce any law governing bankruptcies or that interfere with or complement the national bankruptcy 
law). See also supra text accompanying notes 180·182. 
256See Sticka v. Applebaum (In re Applebaum), 422 B.R. 684, 697 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (Markell,]., 
dissenting) (describing the consequences of the majority's approach as encouraging a "patchwork-quilt 
methodology" consisting of hundreds of different exemption schemes that the bench and bar will have to 
contend with). See also supra notes 128, 133·135 and accompanying text. 
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ability, in spite of Congress's preeminent designated role in the area, to decree 
outcomes that apply only in bankruptcy.257 To do so makes no more sense in 
terms of preserving the integrity of a national, uniform bankruptcy law than 
allowing states to pass legislation insulating its residents from recovery by 
the trustee for certain kinds of preferential transfers, which surely would 
never be countenanced, 258 but the weight of recent authority has approved 
just that result in the case of exemption policy. 
B. FEDERAL UNIFORMITY REVISITED 
In its own ham-handed fashion, BAPCP A has begun to unwind state 
control over exemptions in the case of excessively generous exemptions, 
though the law did nothing about ensuring an adequate minimum level of 
exemptions,259 except in situations where the complex requirements of 
§ 522(b)(3)(A) renders the debtor ineligible for any exemptions.260 The con-
cern, however, for debtors who manipulate their locations or circumstances 
to enjoy larger exemptions than those to which they might otherwise be 
entitled reflects a recognition that, regardless of the exemptions from execu-
tion that such debtor might enjoy under state law, certain uniform, national 
controls must be imposed in the interests of federal bankruptcy policy and 
the differing interests and concerns at stake in a bankruptcy case as con-
trasted with state law judgment execution.261 
Similarly, as a matter of constitutional analysis, there seems to be agree-
257See In re Cross, 255 B.R. 25, 34 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000) (observing that the recognition of state-
created non-bankruptcy entitlements is very different than allowing the states to actually create entitle-
ments in bankruptcy). See also In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626, 631 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) ("[l]n giving 
states the ability to opt out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions Congress did not give them the author-
ity to create bankruptcy exemptions. Instead, what the opt-out represents is a Congressional willingness 
to recognize the generally available exemptions that states have created for their own purposes in bank-
ruptcy proceedings." (quoting Cross, 255 B.R. at 34 n.5)), abrogated by Richardson v. Schafer (In re 
Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013). 
258 See supra note 171. 
259See supra notes 28·31. In addition, BAPCPA expanded the categories of property deemed exempt 
by § 522(b)(3) to include most forms of tax-exempt retirement assets, irrespective of their status under 
state law. See supra note 20. 
260See In re West, 352 B.R. 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that, under these circumstances 
(where a state's exemptions apply by virtue of§ 522(b)(3)(A) but provide that such exemptions only 
extend to residents of that state), the debtor is entitled to the federal exemptions in § 522(d) notwith· 
standing the fact that, as of the date of filing, the debtor resided in an opt·out jurisdiction). Cf In re 
Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, 444·46 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (distinguishing West and comparable authority on 
the ground that these decisions considered the extra-territoriality of the states' exemption law, but not 
their opt·out legislation that similarly only applied to residents of the states). 
2611ronically, the concerns prompting additional restrictions on a debtor's ability to claim state law 
exemptions imposed by BAPCPA are precisely the same as the concerns that caused the NBRC to call for 
a much broader, and a much more equitable, reform of exemption policy in bankruptcy. See supra notes 
25·26 and accompanying text. They are also an important part of the reason that the Framers saw fit to 
repose the bankruptcy power in the national government. See supra text accompanying notes 128·138. 
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ment, even among the courts that recognize the validity of state-enacted 
bankruptcy exemptions, that there are limits on enforceability,262 even if 
those limits are difficult to identify and apply in any given case.263 This 
circumscription was evident as early as the In re Vas~o decision,264 one of the 
first cases involving a challenge to bankruptcy-only state exemptions. The 
court in that decision upheld the constitutionality of a provision of Ohio law 
that, at the time, exempted the debtor's interest in certain property, such as 
deposit accounts, as well as any property, in each case not to exceed $400, 
but only in a bankruptcy proceeding.265 As part of its rationale, the court 
explained that, in adopting the "opt-out"' in § 522(b)(l), Congress' hope was 
"that the states would update and revamp the existing laws, bringing them 
closer into line with the federal exemptions."266 Because this is exactly what 
Ohio did, according to the court, the Ohio law in question could not be 
considered to "interfere with, impede, or conflict with the Congressional pol-
icy of giving debtors a fresh start."267 It seems reasonable to infer from this 
statement, as one might also infer from Judge Cole's statement thirty years 
later in Schafer,268 that a state-enacted exemption statute that was less gener-
ous to the state's residents than its general exemption laws would not pass 
muster. 
As discussed earlier, admission of this apparent boundary, implying some 
regulation on the content of bankruptcy-specific state exemptions, was likely 
seen as necessary to avoid constitutional concerns, although it is not at all 
clear that in fact it does elide those apprehensions.269 In addition, however, it 
also represents a further constraint on the applicability of state exemptions in 
262See supra text accompanying note 189. 
263 See supra text accompanying notes 193· 196. 
2646 B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). 
2650HIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2329.66(A)(4)(a), (A)(17) (1980). The current version of the exemption, 
OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2326.66(A)(18), simply exempts a person's interest in any property not to 
exceed $1,150, but only in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
266Vas~o. 6 B.R. at 322. 
267/d. at 322·23 (suggesting as well that the Ohio legislature had "complied with the intent of 
Congress."). 
268Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601, 616 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
1244 (2013). 
269See supra note 129; supra text accompanying note 194. The fact that a state law happens (or at 
least appears) to coincide with one of the policies underlying the federal bankruptcy law does not itself 
confer authority on the state to pass that law in the first place, and, such authority cannot exist (nor 
arguably, under the current language of§ 522(b), did Congress seek to bestow it) in the face of Congress's 
exclusive responsibility for enacting bankruptcy laws. Despite its later protestations to the contrary in 
Schafer, this is precisely the point made by the Sixth Circuit in Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance 
Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2003), affd on other grounds, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), wherein the court 
noted that the Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, (1819), non-exclusivity interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Clause was "based less on the original understanding of the Convention than on the 
necessity of having some system in place when Congress could not [or did not] enact bankruptcy legisla· 
tion.· (emphasis in original). 
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bankruptcy (or the delegation of control over the subject to the states), call-
ing into question, separate and apart from the constitutional issues, the wis-
dom and, more importantly, the political necessity of continuing the 
recognition of any state exemption laws in bankruptcy cases. The most com-
mon bases for objection to the 1973 recommendation of the Bankruptcy 
Commission on exemptions were that adoption of uniform federal exemptions 
would intrude upon state's rights, produce a sharp increase in bankruptcy 
filings both voluntary and involuntary, unfairly dash creditor reliance on state 
law exemptions, and cabin off too much of the debtor's property from liquida-
tion and distribution to creditors in bankruptcy.27o 
And yet, the continued increase in the number of states adopting bank-
ruptcy-only exemption schemas that actually offer more generous exemptions 
to their debtors in bankruptcy cases, a quarter-century of experience demon-
strating the seeming insignificance of exemptions in precipitating bankruptcy 
filings,m and the fact that, in several instances, the state-enacted bank-
ruptcy-only exemption lists closely mirror the § 522(d) exemptions,272 all 
point to the fact that the opposition, or bases for opposition, that existed in 
the 1970s to mandatory federal bankruptcy exemptions has abated considera-
bly. Concomitantly, the modernization of many state exemption laws since 
1978 27 3 would also seem to have tempered the passions that made state 
versus federal control over the area such a contentious affair in the past. 
Along similar lines, contemporary consumer credit decisions have largely 
come to be based either on individual analysis of the debtor's ability to repay 
(facilitated by credit scoring), particularly in the case of larger extensions of 
credit, such as automobiles and home equity loans,274 and actuarial analysis of 
the aggregate rate and likelihood of default in the case of smaller unsecured 
270See generally Ponoroff, supra note 18 at, 236-46. 
271See Brown, supra note 18, at 186 (noting that if the purpose of the opt-out was to act as a deterrent 
to bankruptcy, there is little evidence that it has worked); SuLLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 240-42 
(finding that variations on filing rates within states (where state exemption laws were uniform) were 
greater than variations among states where exemption laws differed substantially); William]. Woodward, 
Jr. & RichardS. Woodward, Exemptions as an Incentive to Voluntary Ban~ruptcy: An Empirical Study, 57 
AM. BANKR. L.]. 53, 66-70 (1983) (concluding that altering federal exemptions probably has no significant 
effect on bankruptcy filing rates). Cf Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. ]anger, The Myth of the Rational 
Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Ban~ruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REv. 
1481, 1523-25 (2006) (concluding that the evidence thus far as to the correlation between exemption law 
and personal filing rates have produced conflicting and confusing results). 
272See supra text accompanying notes 67, 76. 
273 See supra note 248. 
274Liran Einav, Mark Jenkins & Jonathan Levin, The Impact of Credit Scoring on Consumer Lending, 
44 RAND ]. OF EcoN. 249 (2013) (discussing the positive impact of automated credit scoring of the 
profitability of consumer lending), available at http://www.stanford.edu/-leinav/pubs/RAND2013.pdf. 
David A. Lander, "It 'Is' the Best of Times, It 'Is' the Worst of Times": A Short Essay on Consumer 
Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 205 (2004) (attributing the increased profit-
ability of higher risk consumer lending to lender consolidation and improved credit-scoring techniques). 
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extensions of revolving credit, such as most credit card transaction arrange-
ments.275 In other words, actual creditor reliance on state exemption levels, 
an argument previously raised in opposition to federalizing the law in this 
area, 276 is virtually non-existent, except perhaps to the extent that the abuse 
of unlimited exemptions in a few states produces higher overall costs of 
credit. Furthermore, regulatory changes in the banking and finance arena 
have made consumer credit a far less local affair,277 and the less local the 
relationship the less reliance on state exemptions as a source of repayment. 
In short, the growing obsolescence of the reasons why states wanted to 
exclude their debtors from access to federal exemptions,278 coupled with 
BAPCPA's both limitation on and expansion of state exemptions when re-
quired or permitted, all point to the desirability of solving the issue of the 
constitutionality of bankruptcy-specific exemptions by making the point 
moot. In other words, the benefits to be derived from mandatory uniform 
federal exemptions in bankruptcy that have caused so many objective com-
mentators to call for their adoption279 remain no less robust than they ever 
275See Tom Brown & Lacey ?Iache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 
73·74 (2006) (discussing how technological changes, including the Internet, have transformed consumer 
lending); Sousa, supra note 1, at 612 ("[S]ophisticated consumer lenders have spreadsheets and actuarial 
tables backed by complex financial models that predict their rate of loss and expected profit margins based 
upon their portfolio of borrowers. In other words, the prudent lender has already calculated average 
expected losses and profits ex ante, before ever transacting with a potential customer. So if a creditor 
lends and the debtor later fails to repay, the creditor is best positioned to bear the consequences of 
default."); SuLLIVAN, ET AL., supra note 19, at 285·87 (describing actuarial lending and distinguishing it 
from the process typically involved in commercial lending). See also Ponoroff, supra note 18, at 244 n.113 
(collecting authorities demonstrating the increasingly less local character of the banking and financial ser· 
vices industries); Bernard Shull & Gerald A. Hanweck, Ban~ Merger Policy: Proposals for Change, 119 
BANKING LJ. 214 (2002) (discussing the consolidation of occurring since the 1980's in the commercial 
banking arena as a result of merger activity). 
276See, e.g., William T. Vukowich, 'The Ban~ruptcy Commission's Proposal Regarding Ban~rupts' Ex· 
emption Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1439, 1444 (1975) (suggesting creditor reliance on local exemptions as a 
justification supporting § 6 of the 1898 Act). 
277The days of high·touch, local, personali;:ed banking, such as George Bailey's neighbors received from 
Bailey Building & Loan, IT's A WoNDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films, Inc. 1946), are increasingly becoming a 
vestigial remnant of days gone by. Rob Cox, So Long, Bailey Building & Loan, THE NEw YORK TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2010), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/business/23views.html?_r=O (discussing the dis· 
proportionately more burdensome impact of regulatory requirements on locally owned community banks 
and finance companies). See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 'The Dar~ Side of Universal Ban~ing: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CoNN L. REv. 963 (2009) (analy;:ing 
the effects of mass marketing, automated processing, credit scoring, and securiti;:ation on consumer lending 
business). 
278 As detailed, these included concerns over the excessive generosity of the Code's exemptions, an 
increase in bankruptcy filings to take advantage of the exemptions, dashed creditor reliance, and that the 
Code ignores the essentially local character of exemptions laws. 
279See authorities cited supra note 241. See also Vukowich, supra note 276, at 1441·46 (extolling the 
desirability of the Commission's proposal for uniform federal exemptions in bankruptcy); Note, Ban~ruptcy 
Exemptions: A Full Circle Bac~ to the Act of 1800?, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 663, 664·65, 668 (1968) (ad· 
dressing the inadequacy of use of state law exemptions in bankruptcy). 
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were, but the reasons for resistance (other than a purely ideological attach-
ment to the notion of states' rights280) have been blunted considerably. 
It should finally be noted that states might continue to have some role to 
play even under a system incorporating most of the features of mandatory 
uniform federal exemptions, albeit to a far lesser extent than is currently the 
case. That is to say, there are certain aspects of exemption policy that con-
tinue to have some local flavor by virtue of regional differences in cost of 
living and the relative importance of different types of property in different 
parts of the country.281 Of course, in some instances, intrastate differences in 
these areas can be as significant as interstate differences, and, in any event, 
there are certainly ways to deal with both of these issues in a purely federal 
system.282 Nevertheless, the point remains that this could be an area where 
there is some flexibility for a form of ~reverse" cooperative federalism to oper-
ate. While the term cooperative federalism is typically used to describe pro-
grams in which the states are delegated primary responsibility for the 
administration of important federal initiatives, commonly in the areas of la-
bor, the environment, and healthcare,283 the idea of shared responsibility to 
solve a common problem might apply equally to the dilemma associated with 
assuring that federal bankruptcy policy at the national level is implemented in 
a manner that accounts for local differences in standards of living and the 
necessity or desirability of owning particular categories of property in differ-
ent parts of the country. 
Local variations are likely to be most significant in the case of the home-
stead exemption since it is typically the largest dollar value exemption and 
real estate is subject to greater regional differentiation in value than virtually 
any form of personal property. Thus, as recommended by the NBRC,284 
state-determined homestead exemptions might continue to control in bank-
2800n that score, see Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some N.otes on a N.ational 
N.eurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 903, 908·09 (1994) (dismissing federalism as the anachronistic residue of 
eighteenth century British colonial administration). 
281 For example, no national listing of types or categories of exempt property is likely to include "one 
snowblower" and "one large crawfish boiling pot," but each is essential to, respectively, residents of north· 
ern Minnesota and southern Louisiana. See generally Ponoroff, supra note 18, at 238. 
282/d. at 238·39, 246 (pointing out that use of a single cash denominated limit for personal property 
would account for the differing needs of debtors in different states, and adjustment of the exempt dollar 
value limit by regional CPJ would address differences in cost of living). Others have made these sugges· 
tion as well, see id. at 238 n.81, and they also formed the basis of Judge Brown's and my recommendations 
to the NBRC, and that the NBRC largely adopted in its 1997 Report. See supra notes 25·27 and accom· 
panying text. 
283See generally Ronald]. Krotoszynski, Cooperative Federalism, the N.ew Formalism, and the Separation 
of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government 
Officers Enforcing Federal Laws, 61 DUKE L.]. 1599, 1629·35 (2012) (providing an overview of three 
current cooperative federalism programs and reviewing elements common to such programs generally). 
284See supra notes 25·27, 282 and accompanying text. 
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ruptcy cases, but subject to a federal floor as well as ceiling, and with neither 
being time limited as is currently the case.285 Likewise, the states might be 
given authority to designate, subject to a dollar limitation, one or two items 
of non-real property that residents of that state could exempt in a bankruptcy 
case in addition to the federally-designated categories of exempt property or, 
preferably, in addition to the lump-sum cash allowance for personal property 
exemptions provided for by the Code.286 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of state-promulgated bankruptcy exemptions re-
mains in doubt. The doctrine of geographical uniformity may allow for debt-
ors from different jurisdictions to experience different outcomes in 
bankruptcy if that is Congress's will. That, however, is a far cry from con-
gressional acquiescence in state intrusion into the constitutionally enshrined 
policy for national control and uniformity in the establishment of bankruptcy 
laws. In other words, Article l's conferring on Congress the power to pro-
mulgate a uniform national law does not preclude enactment of a rule that 
leaves some aspect upon which the operation of that otherwise uniform rule 
depends to state or local law. It does, however, mean that Congress cannot 
constitutionally delegate back to the states the power to make a law over a 
subject that the Constitution entrusts to the federal government. Thus, 
Congress may decide to allow a state law, adopted for general purposes, to 
apply in bankruptcy, or seemingly even give the states the authority to make 
the decision, as with the opt-out, that the state law shall govern some aspect 
of the bankruptcy proceeding. State-enacted bankruptcy-only exemptions 
schemas, however, exceed those limitations inasmuch as they entail directing 
bankruptcy outcomes separate and distinct from treatment of the same issues 
under general state law. 
Aside from the limitations imposed by the Bankruptcy Clause, there is 
also the question of preemption. It seems universally to be agreed that the 
Supremacy Clause would prohibit the enforceability of state legislation that 
undermines national policy. 287 Yet, once we allow the states, rather than 
Congress, to determine what law applies in, and only in, a federal bankruptcy 
case, we open the door to precisely that result inasmuch as the impact of a 
state statute on national bankruptcy policy is neither consistent nor constant 
285The limitations that BAPCP A placed on the homestead exemption lapse after a certain period of 
time. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Under the NBRC proposal, both the ceiling and the floor 
would be permanent. 
286Bottrell, supra note 247, 91·92, 96·97 (noting that most states have a "hodge podge" exemption 
scheme and suggesting the wiser approach would be to have a single exemption with a dollar limitation 
that the debtor can use as he or she best sees fit). See also supra note 282. 
287See supra notes 144, 175 and accompanying text. 
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from case to case nor over time. Therefore, the phenomenon, if permitted, 
poses the very real, but difficult to detect, threat of impermissible interfer-
ence by the states with the objectives of the federal bankruptcy law. Correl-
atively, it could also create potential concerns under the Contracts Clause 
should a state become too generous in its bankruptcy-only exemption 
scheme,288 although Congress seems at least to have awakened and responded 
to that possibility in the 2005 amendments.289 
The reasoning of the decisions rejecting constitutional attacks on bank-
ruptcy-specific exemption schemes merits reconsideration. It is not at all 
clear that Congress has, in fact, delegated this authority to the states in the 
first place, and, in any case,§ 522(b) ought not be construed so as to create a 
constitutional issue.29° Therefore, state-enacted bankruptcy-only statutes 
should be struck as violative of both the Bankruptcy Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The states are certainly free to resur-
rect those exemptions, so long as Congress maintains the opt-out, by making 
them available generally. If, however, that option is politically unpalatable, 
whether to local creditors or other intrastate interests,291 then that is where 
things must stand. 
There is, however, a more expedient and sensible alternative to striking 
each of these laws, and an alternative that the very existence of these laws 
implies is timely. That is, of course, to revisit the recommendation from two 
blue ribbon commissions, and virtually every scholar to comment on the sub-
ject,292 urging restoration of the regime under the first two federal bank-
ruptcy laws of national legislative control over bankruptcy exemptions.293 
288See supra note 138. 
289See supra text accompanying notes 30-31. 
29D'fhis is precisely the approach recommended by Judge Rhodes in In re Reinhart. 460 B.R. 466, 469 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (urging that§ 522(b) should be construed so as to avoid a serious question as to 
its constitutionality), abrogated by Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1244 (2013). 
291See William T. Plumb, Jr., 'The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-
Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. Rev. 1, 152 (1975). (opposing federalization of bankruptcy 
exemptions, but acknowledging that that convenience to national creditors might be the only positive gain 
from adoption of national exemptions over varied rules of state law). See also supra note 83 (discussing the 
fact that permitting states to enact bankruptcy exemptions opens the door to this type of discrimination in 
favor of local creditors in contravention of bankruptcy equality policy, and may even be the explanation 
for why states have limited their exemptions reforms to the bankruptcy setting). 
292See authorities cited supra notes 243, 279. There are two notable commentators who have taken 
contrary views: Professors Kennedy and Plumb. See Kennedy, supra note 17, at 446-53 (expressing con-
cern over strategic behavior and creditor reliance on state exemption levels); Plumb, supra note 291, at 152 
(inquiring whether there really is "any federal interest in seeing that the same properties are exempt from 
creditors in Kansas as in New York, that Virginia's exemptions are the same as California's?"). Though it 
will be recalled that Professor Kennedy would later become the Executive Director of the Commission, 
formed in 1970, that eventually recommended uniform federal exemptions. See supra note 17. 
29 l See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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The case in favor of uniform federal bankruptcy exemptions, other than on 
the basis of constitutional mandate, is well known. The scholarly criticism of 
the former Bankruptcy Act's approach to exemptions and the arguments in 
favor of federali2:ing the subject remain no less valid today than when they 
were first presented, but the complexion of the argument has changed in cer-
tain respects due both to doctrinal changes and changes in consumer credit 
practices. To some extent, the concerns that prompted the call for uniform-
ity have abated,294 although certainly not to anywhere near the point of elim-
ination. Likewise, express creditor reliance on exemptions in connection with 
unsecured extensions of credit is far more the exception than the rule it may 
have been even thirty years ago.29 5 On the other side of the equation, the 
increase in the promulgation by the states of exemptions applicable only in 
bankruptcy, and generally more favorable than the state's general exemptions, 
represents both ( 1) new reason to eliminate incorporation of state exemptions 
laws and the opt-out, and (2) reason to imagine that what might not have 
been palatable in the years leading up to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
may now be politically acceptable. 
Even if changes in lending practices and national consolidation in the fi-
nancial services industry have made exemptions less important from the per-
spective of state policy,29 6 the same is not true with regard to the role 
exemptions play in ensuring accomplishment of core bankruptcy policies, such 
as the fresh start and the fair and equitable treatment of similarly positioned 
creditors. That is to say, while the purpose for exemptions under state and 
federal bankruptcy law seems at first blush to overlap considerably, there are 
critical differences, and differences that make continued reliance on state ex-
emptions in bankruptcy imprudent. The inability of states under the Con-
tract Clause to discharge existing obligations,297 and the indifference of state 
collection law to the interests of creditors inter se, represent key points of 
discrepancy in the environments in which exemption laws are enacted and 
operate. That dces and should necessarily impact the content of those laws. 
Foremost, however, by definition, the states can only enact legislation with 
local and insular interests in mind; Congress alone can enact exemption legis-
lation with the outlook of effectuating the broader national interest in debtor 
relief and creditors' rights. 
294The wide disparity between most states' exemptions, still mired in nineteenth century approaches 
in the 1970s, and the federal exemptions, has been closed to some extent by the modernization over the 
past several decades in most state exemption schemas. See supra note 248. 
295See supra text accompanying note 276. Even in the 1970s, the concern may have been overstated. 
See Vukowich, supra note 276, at 1444 (pointing out the increasingly mobile nature of American society 
had already made it imprudent for creditors to rely on the exemption laws of the debtor's state of resi· 
dence at the time the credit was extended). 
296See supra notes 273·276 and accompanying text. 
297See supra note 138. 
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These differences have always supported the argument for federalizing 
exemptions in bankruptcy. The growing phenomenon of state-enacted bank-
ruptcy legislation makes the case even stronger, both by weakening the tradi-
tional arguments in favor of state control over exemption policy and by 
increasing the harm to the national interest created by reliance on state law. 
The "opt-out compromise" in 1978 was a cop-out, but it never contemplated 
ceding back to the states the power to legislate particular features of and 
outcomes in bankruptcy cases. Such legislation would be violative of the 
uniformity requirement properly understood and preempted by Congress' su-
preme authority in the field. Congress may delegate to the states the right to 
avoid certain aspects of federal law as it relates to their citizens, but Congress 
may not delegate, and arguably has not delegated, to the states authority to 
establish key features of the federal bankruptcy law. Thus, at a minimum, 
bankruptcy-specific exemption laws should be struck as constitutionally in-
firm. The even better, and certainly more holistic solution, however, is to 
seize the opportunity to reverse the mistakes of history and politics that have 
plagued exemption policy in bankruptcy for over a hundred years by leaving 
the states a proper role only in those areas where concerns are decidedly 
local, and otherwise assure that core bankruptcy policy will be served, as 
intended by the Framers, on a national basis through the adoption of 
mandatory, and truly uniform, federal rules governing exemptions in bank-
ruptcy cases. 
